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Foreword 
In its Research Plan 2000, the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research 
(CAEPR) identified the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) 
scheme as a key area for research. This focus was driven by two broad agendas. 
First, in CAEPR’s negotiation of research priorities with the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) late in 1999, ATSIC’s then Economic Division 
highlighted the scheme as an important priority area. Not only is the scheme 
ATSIC’s largest program, but it is also coming under increasing government 
scrutiny. This scrutiny is motivated in part by an emerging view that the scheme 
is predominantly about employment generation: that is, it is a labour market 
program. For example, the most recent definition of CDEP program objectives 
notes that it ‘aims to provide employment opportunities for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples to gain work experience in community managed activities’. 
Historically, since its establishment in 1977 and until the 1997 Spicer Review of 
the scheme, it has also been regarded as a flexible community development, 
income support, training, and enterprise development program. The scheme is 
also under some scrutiny by the Department of Finance and Administration 
which is assessing the efficacy of its associated administrative on-costs. 
The McClure Committee’s major review of the Australian welfare system, 
undertaken during 2000, was the second motivating factor. Because the CDEP 
scheme has a notional financial link with the welfare entitlements of participants, 
any McClure-based recommendations to reform welfare could have potential 
ramifications for the scheme. Furthermore, the McClure Committee’s emphasis 
on the principle of mutual obligation for welfare recipients makes the CDEP 
scheme a potentially important precedent. While there are important differences 
between the CDEP scheme and the mainstream Work for the Dole Program, in 
most situations there are requirements that scheme participants work for their 
wages, and these are notionally linked to welfare entitlements. The CDEP 
scheme’s 23-year history provides an important body of data for empirical 
research on how mutual obligation might operate in practice. 
CAEPR staff undertook a great deal of research on the CDEP scheme in 2000, 
much of which was reported at the three-day conference ‘The Indigenous Welfare 
Economy and the CDEP Scheme’ convened at the Australian National University 
in early November 2000. The detailed proceedings of that conference are to be 
separately published in 2001. CAEPR researchers also undertook three detailed 
case studies dealing with the operation of the CDEP scheme in three very different 
contexts. These were: 
• A case study undertaken by Matthew Gray and Elaine Thacker in the Port 
Augusta region on the Bungala CDEP organisation, reported in CAEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 208;  
• A case study by Jon Altman and Victoria Johnson undertaken in the 
Maningrida region, central Arnhem Land on the Bawinanga Aboriginal 
Corporation (BAC) CDEP and reported in this Discussion Paper (No. 209); and 
iv ALTMAN AND JOHNSON 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
• A case study undertaken by Ray Madden in urban western Victoria on the 
operations of the Worn Gundidj CDEP organisation, reported in CAEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 210. 
Each of these three case studies required careful negotiations to ensure a high 
level of collaboration with participating CDEP organisations and an appropriate 
level of transparency and independence in the reporting of the research findings. 
To varying extents, all three differ from the standard CAEPR Discussion Paper 
because they address two distinct audiences: the CDEP organisations that are the 
subjects of the research and a wider constituency that includes other CDEP 
community organisations, government agencies, policy makers, and academics. 
Consequently, each paper reads in part like a consultancy report and in part like 
an academic applied research report. In all three case studies though, the 
authors have attempted to go beyond the specifics to more general issues for 
Indigenous affairs policy, while also being conscious of the enormous variation in 
the particular circumstances of the nearly 300 CDEP schemes Australia-wide. 
Indeed some of this diversity is represented in these three case studies and it is 
suggested that CAEPR Discussion Papers 208–10 be regarded, and read, as a set. 
Professor Jon Altman 
Director, CAEPR 
December 2000
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 209  v 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Table of Contents 
Foreword............................................................................................................ iii 
Abbreviations and acronyms ...............................................................................vi 
Summary...........................................................................................................vii 
Case study choice ..............................................................................................vii 
Methodology.......................................................................................................vii 
Economic and social context .............................................................................viii 
Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation ....................................................................viii 
The BAC CDEP scheme .....................................................................................viii 
Economic and social impacts ............................................................................. ix 
Policy issues....................................................................................................... ix 
The complex sociology of CDEP work................................................................... x 
Recommendations.............................................................................................. xi 
Acknowledgments ..............................................................................................xii 
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
The case study: Why Maningrida? .................................................................... 2 
Methodology and the collection of the data .................................................... 3 
Economic and social context ............................................................................ 5 
The origins and organisational identity of the Bawinanga  
Aboriginal Corporation ...................................................................................... 9 
The BAC CDEP: An explanatory and exploratory overview ........................... 13 
Economic and social impacts ......................................................................... 18 
Income effects ................................................................................................... 19 
Employment effects ........................................................................................... 20 
Enterprise development..................................................................................... 22 
Service delivery and client services .................................................................... 23 
Training ............................................................................................................ 23 
Policy issues for BAC, for ATSIC, and for government .................................. 24 
The identity of BAC CDEP scheme in town and country .................................... 25 
Active versus passive welfare............................................................................. 25 
The definition of work and the issue of substitution .......................................... 27 
Inter-organisational rivalry................................................................................ 27 
Organisational vulnerability .............................................................................. 28 
Planning, reporting, accountability and feedback .............................................. 28 
Employment generation for whom? ................................................................... 29 
Stakeholder participation .................................................................................. 30 
The complex sociology of CDEP work ............................................................ 30 
Recommendations........................................................................................... 32 
The benefits and costs of the CDEP scheme .................................................. 34 
Notes ................................................................................................................ 35 
Appendix 1: Participants’ views about the CDEP scheme ............................. 36 
References ....................................................................................................... 37 
vi ALTMAN AND JOHNSON 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Tables 
Table 1. Salient features of the regional Indigenous population  
in Maningrida township and outstations, 1996 Census...................6 
Table 2. Some salient Indigenous and non-Indigenous comparisons, 
Maningrida, 1996 Census ...............................................................8 
Table 3. ATSIC funding of BAC, 1990–91 to 1997–98 .................................10 
Table 4. BAC consolidated financial accounts and the CDEP  
scheme, 1995–96 to 1999–2000 ....................................................12 
Table 5. CDEP grant income by financial year, 1995–96 to  
1999–2000....................................................................................14 
Table 6. CDEP Maningrida-based projects and outsourced 
participants, 2000.........................................................................17 
Abbreviations and acronyms 
ATSIC Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics 
AGPS Australian Government Publishing Service 
AIAS Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies (now AIATSIS) 
AIATSIS Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Studies 
ANU The Australian National University 
BAC Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation 
CAEPR Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research 
CDEP Community Development Employment Projects 
CGC Commonwealth Grants Commission 
CTP Community Training Program 
DEWRSB Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small 
Business 
HIPP Health Infrastructure Priorities Program 
IEP Indigenous Employment Program 
IHANT Indigenous Housing Authority of the Northern Territory 
JET Jobs, Education and Training 
MAC Maningrida Arts and Culture 
MPA Maningrida Progress Association 
NAHS National Aboriginal Health Strategy 
NARU North Australia Research Unit 
NTETA Northern Territory Employment and Training Authority 
ORA Outstation Resource Agency 
R&M repair and maintenance 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 209  vii 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Summary 
This Discussion Paper presents the findings of research undertaken in 2000 on 
the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme administered 
by the Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation (BAC). BAC is located in the township of 
Maningrida in central Arnhem Land, and the CDEP scheme has participants 
residing both in Maningrida township and at outstations in the hinterland. A 
feature of the research is the comparative focus on ‘town’ and ‘country’. The 
primary aim of the research is to assess the net benefits generated by the 
operation of the scheme in these two contexts. Benefits are defined not only in 
terms of employment generation, but also more broadly to include social, cultural 
and other economic benefits. The discussion is couched in terms of current social 
policy debates that highlight the apparent negative impacts of welfare dependence 
and especially ‘passive’ welfare. This case study focuses on a situation where 
what could be termed ‘active’ welfare—CDEP scheme participation—has been an 
important option, and concludes that there is evidence of significant net benefit 
from the scheme in a range of areas. On balance, the positives of the scheme 
outweigh the negatives in the Maningrida regional context, but this does not 
indicate room for complacency: the workings of the scheme can be improved and 
some recommendations for change are made. These are summarised below. 
Case study choice 
BAC is an important case study for many reasons. It is located in central Arnhem 
Land, in a remote locality. There have been very few case studies of such 
localities. It is a large scheme with over 500 participants—nearly 2 per cent of all 
participants Australia-wide. The scheme is administered to participants based 
both in a township and at outstations. It has been operative for over a decade and 
is consequently well established. 
The authors of this discussion paper have had considerable research and work 
experience in the region: Jon Altman has undertaken research in the Maningrida 
region since 1979, while Victoria Johnson worked in Maningrida between 1998 
and 2000. The links that both researchers have forged with local organisations 
and people resulted not only in BAC and its members, but also others in the 
region, collaborating very openly and actively with the research project. This 
reflects in part the keenness both of the organisation and of its members to 
demonstrate the benefits of the CDEP scheme, and to highlight areas for 
improvement. 
Methodology 
Much of the research reported here was undertaken in the Maningrida region in 
the months of June and July 2000. Information was collected at BAC via file 
search and through examination of CDEP scheme records. A great deal of 
research was conducted by interviewing supervisors and participants in the 
scheme, but also by interviewing managers of all other major organisations and 
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service delivery agencies in the Maningrida region. Two different questionnaires 
were administered, one to almost all supervisors of CDEP projects in Maningrida 
(the results are integrated into the general findings) and the other (see Appendix 
1) to about 10 per cent of all CDEP participants. 
Other research methods included literature search, file search and interview of 
staff in ATSIC’s Darwin Regional Office, and analysis of data from the 1996 
Census. An unusual feature of the research is that the stakeholders’ views about 
research findings were actively sought in three seminars, two convened by ATSIC 
in Darwin and one convened by BAC in Maningrida. Feedback on an earlier draft 
of the paper was also sought from BAC. This research is a continuation of earlier 
work by Altman in 1998 on BAC’s role as an outstation resource agency and in 
1999 on a business development plan for BAC’s arts centre, Maningrida Arts and 
Culture (MAC). 
Economic and social context 
The 1996 Census estimated a regional Indigenous population of about 1,700, 
with 1,195 residing in Maningrida and 521 at outstations. The non-Indigenous 
population of Maningrida was 111. All these figures appear to be slight 
underestimates. The region is devoid of a commercial economic base; all told in 
1996 there were only 89 non-CDEP jobs held by Indigenous people, and 87 held 
by non-Indigenous people. It is estimated that without CDEP, the unemployment 
rate at outstations, which is officially 5.7 per cent, would approach 100 per cent, 
while at Maningrida where it is officially 9.6 per cent it would approach 90 per 
cent. 
Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation 
BAC was incorporated as an Outstation Resource Agency (ORA) in 1979 to 
provide municipal-type services to about 30 outstation communities in a 10,000 
km2 regional hinterland. From 1989, BAC has grown rapidly and its identity has 
changed considerably. It is now recognised as a complex regional organisation 
that fulfills three important roles: it remains a service delivery agency for 
outstations (including acting as a representative organisation on land 
management issues); it has become a large CDEP organisation; and it has evolved 
into a regional economic development agency. These three broad functions can be 
delineated financially: of total BAC income in 1999–2000 of $16m, $6.4m (40%) is 
linked to CDEP; 43 per cent is trading income from enterprises activities, and the 
balance (17%) is linked to its service roles. 
The BAC CDEP scheme 
The BAC CDEP scheme is organisationally complex: since 1997–98 it has had an 
annual budget in excess of $6m and just over 500 participants. Participants are 
distributed across 26 outstation timesheets and 31 projects, with almost all the 
projects being town-based. In mid 2000, the township and outstation components 
of the scheme were administered quite differently. In the township, participants 
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are recruited on a project basis and are expected to work on these projects for 18 
hours per week for a standard CDEP wages entitlement. In town, a ‘no work, no 
pay’ rule is variably applied and there is potential to work longer hours for 
additional income. At outstations, participants are not work tested and receive a 
standard 36 hours CDEP pay per fortnight. The structural divide between town 
and country creates problems for the effective administration of the scheme, 
especially because the regional population is highly mobile. 
BAC also administers the Maningrida Council’s allocation of 115 participants, 
who are primarily engaged in the delivery of municipal services. Other town-based 
projects include employment with enterprises, with service and infrastructure 
providers, in provision of social and cultural services, in training, and in office 
administration. At outstations, a large number of CDEP participants engage in 
the manufacture of arts and crafts for sale to MAC, and in informal economic 
activities such as hunting, fishing, and gathering. 
Economic and social impacts 
The key focus in measuring economic and social impact is on the program goals 
designed to create employment, supplement incomes, encourage enterprise, 
provide services, and provide training. Overall, the scheme has a positive impact 
on participants’ cash incomes, with supplementation occurring through 
additional work generated (universally termed ‘top up’) and extra wages earned, or 
through manufacture of art for sale while on CDEP, especially at outstations 
where other formal employment options are non-existent. The employment effects 
of the scheme are limited, with little evidence of participants exiting to 
mainstream full-time jobs. However, this is not surprising given that the local 
non-CDEP labour market is limited to less than 200 positions. A government 
incentive to BAC of $2,200 for every exit to non-CDEP continuing employment is 
ineffectual. The CDEP scheme has facilitated enterprise development under the 
auspices of BAC. Many of these enterprises are in the services sector and are 
dependent on funded CDEP labour and on recycling of government money. There 
are some embryonic export-oriented enterprises: the most successful is MAC, 
others include the commercial harvesting of wildlife and joint venture safari 
hunting and recreational fishing. The client services provided by BAC CDEP 
include financial services and especially a mechanism to facilitate saving for the 
purchase of vehicles, for ceremonial activity, for housing repair and maintenance, 
and to make payments to traditional owners of Maningrida that are deemed to be 
appropriate. The CDEP scheme in tandem with the Maningrida Jobs, Education 
and Training (JET) Corporation provides a wide range of training options that 
would not otherwise be locally available. 
Policy issues 
There is a range of policy issues that need to be addressed to make the BAC 
CDEP more effective. 
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1. The administration of one type of CDEP scheme in a township and another 
in the hinterland is problematic, especially given the propensity of 
outstation people to reside in the township for prolonged periods. 
2. The existence of an ‘active’ welfare CDEP scheme alongside a ‘passive’ 
welfare Centrelink regime creates a degree of difficulty in trying to apply a 
‘no work, no pay’ rule in the township. 
3. There is evidence that the CDEP scheme is operating as a substitution 
labour-funding scheme and that CDEP labour is undertaking a range of 
tasks that other agencies are, or should be, funded to provide. 
4. The growth and success of the BAC CDEP scheme is creating inter-agency 
rivalry and tensions within the Maningrida region. 
5. The growth of the BAC CDEP scheme has occurred with minimal business 
or participatory planning and little rigorous evaluation of outcomes. 
6. There is some evidence that CDEP-scheme generated employment growth, 
especially in managerial and senior administrative positions, primarily 
involves non-Indigenous people. This is due in large part to limited 
aspirations for such work within the local population, and a very limited 
supply of appropriately qualified Indigenous people. 
7. There is associated evidence of a degree of alienation within the BAC 
membership, resulting in a lack of participation in the management of BAC. 
With limited administrative resources, priority is being given to external 
financial accountability rather than internal accountability to, and 
empowerment of, members. This problem could undermine the longer-term 
political sustainability of the scheme. 
The complex sociology of CDEP work 
A combination of some of the unresolved policy issues identified above and 
regional political and cultural factors appears to be undermining the incentive of 
CDEP scheme participants to seek regular paid employment, especially in the 
township. These cultural and social factors are analysed within the explanatory 
framework of ‘domain separation’, drawn from anthropology, and by reference to 
the concept of ‘income replacement ratio’, drawn from labour economics. The 
domain separation framework allows us to put forward the hypothesis that 
Aboriginal people differentiate between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal domains of 
work, and that this differentiation is driven by the dynamics of their kin-based 
society. The Aboriginal social setting, with its particular cultural form of anti-
individualism, does not tolerate those with appropriate formal skills taking 
managerial positions if they lack other forms of authority. In the labour-
economics framework, the marginal financial returns from undertaking additional 
work can be shown not to offset the actual or potential costs of social exclusion; 
nor does increased earning capacity obviate the cultural requirement to share 
with kin. It is unclear how appropriate mechanisms can be established to 
encourage people to seek full-time employment in the context of these cultural 
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factors, and indeed there are very few full-time jobs available locally, even for 
those who wish for them. The sociology of CDEP (and other) work thus remains 
complex, and the effects of the scheme are (and will remain) paradoxical if its 
aims are defined in terms of encouraging people into mainstream full-time 
employment and reduced dependence. 
Recommendations 
The BAC case study provides the basis for the following recommendations: 
• program guidelines should distinguish between CDEP in ‘town’ and in 
‘country’; 
• the various manifestations of the scheme need to be distinguished: in some 
cases it operates to generate employment, training, or community 
development and in others it merely operates as minimum income support; 
• efforts must be made to distinguish active CDEP participation from passive 
welfare and suitable incentives should be provided to encourage the former; 
• efforts must be made to limit the substitution that is being underwritten by 
CDEP scheme activities; 
• a whole-of-organisation and consistent implementation of the ‘no work, no 
pay’ rule is needed; and 
• there is need for quarantined resourcing for more effective planning and 
outcomes monitoring, and a concomitant commitment by ATSIC to provide 
triennial funding on a rolling basis for those organisations that are 
implementing the scheme successfully. 
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Introduction 
The research reported in this Discussion Paper concerns the operation of the 
Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme administered by 
the Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation (BAC). BAC is located in the township of 
Maningrida in north-central Arnhem Land, approximately 500 km east of Darwin, 
on Aboriginal land. BAC was originally established as an Outstation Resource 
Agency (ORA), but since 1989 it has grown as a CDEP organisation and now 
administers a large CDEP scheme with over 500 participants. 
The CDEP scheme is a program that is controlled by the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). Under the program, individuals forego access 
to welfare payments and instead work part time for wages. ‘Work’ is generally 
defined by the community organisation that administers the scheme and there 
are often opportunities to undertake additional work for what is known, in the 
emerging Australia-wide CDEP lexicon, as ‘top up’. The organisation is provided 
with funds to pay part-time wages (notionally linked to participants’ welfare 
entitlements), to administer the scheme (so called ‘on-costs’), and with funds to 
purchase capital equipment. 
The research, undertaken by the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Research 
(CAEPR) during 2000, was motivated by various factors, some of which have been 
discussed in the Foreword. In addition, it should be noted that one of the authors 
has had a long-term research interest in the CDEP scheme, dating back to its 
beginning in 1976–77. Altman and Nieuwenhuysen (1979) used an economic 
model to demonstrate theoretically that the scheme may be well suited to 
Indigenous people who are interested in part-time work and whose cultural 
prerogatives make full-time work problematic. These are the so called ‘leisure 
preferers’ according to the indifference curve analysis then used (Altman & 
Nieuwenhuysen 1979: 201–4). This long-term interest in the CDEP scheme is 
matched by an interest, equally long-term, in the Maningrida regional economy 
(see Altman 1987). The present case study provides an opportunity to combine 
these two long-term research interests in collaboration with a community-based 
CDEP organisation. 
ATSIC and CDEP organisations are keen to demonstrate that the CDEP scheme 
generates social, economic, and cultural benefits that exceed its explicit 
employment effects. Perhaps a more interesting question, given the structural 
difficulties faced by the nearly 300 community organisations that administer the 
scheme, is the extent to which CDEP scheme participation is evolving into a final 
job destination, at a time when broader social policy is concerned with the 
apparently negative impacts of ‘passive’ welfare dependence. These have recently 
been vividly highlighted by Pearson (2000). The final McClure Report on Welfare 
Reform, publicly released in August 2000 (McClure 2000), similarly highlights 
problems with passive welfare and argues for the radical restructuring of the 
social security system in accordance with the principle of mutual obligation and 
the enhanced economic and social participation associated with that principle. 
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Two critical issues are in need of investigation in the current social policy reform 
environment; both are over-arching themes throughout this paper. 
1. The CDEP scheme was established as a form of ‘active’ welfare, sometimes 
termed ‘workfare’ (see Sanders 1988). The issue is whether some of the 
negative aspects of passive welfare extend to CDEP participation and if so, 
whether this is because of inherent shortcomings in the scheme or other 
environmental factors, the most obvious being the co-existence of a passive 
welfare regime. 
2. The CDEP scheme’s establishment and growth has been largely predicated 
on maintaining a nexus with participants’ welfare entitlements (Department 
of Aboriginal Affairs 1990; Sanders 1988, 1993). The net cost of the scheme 
to government has been largely limited to administration and capital on-
costs, although many of these are, arguably, offsets that government would 
need to pay anyhow. If the reform of the welfare system seeks more active 
participation from its clients, this in turn will fundamentally alter 
Australia’s income maintenance system, and the very foundation of the 
CDEP scheme, the ‘nexus’, may be under challenge. 
This paper is structured as follows. It provides a brief explanation for the choice 
of the Maningrida region for this case study and a description of the research 
methodology employed. Next it presents an overview of the regional economic and 
social context, mainly from secondary sources. It then gives a descriptive overview 
of the workings of the BAC CDEP scheme. An analysis of the major economic and 
social impacts of the scheme follows, and a range of policy issues are raised for 
BAC, ATSIC, and government. The discussion then moves to the sociology of 
CDEP work, an issue of crucial importance that informs the recommendations for 
policy and program changes which are based on this case study. Finally, the 
paper concludes with a consideration of the impacts of the scheme and some 
broader considerations. 
The case study: Why Maningrida? 
The choice of the Maningrida region for this case study was influenced by many 
factors including the following: 
• Altman has undertaken research on the Maningrida regional economy since 
1979; 
• while the CDEP scheme is administered in both Maningrida township (‘town’) 
and at outstations in the hinterland (‘country’) there is also a welfare regime 
currently operating in both, although predominantly in the town; the 
Maningrida case thus provides an opportunity for some comparison of the 
variable impacts of welfare and CDEP; 
• Altman is familiar with BAC, the ORA administering the CDEP scheme, 
owing to its inclusion in a national review of ORAs conducted in 1998 
(Altman, Gillespie, & Palmer 1998) and following his undertaking of a 
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business development plan for Maningrida Arts and Culture (MAC), a part of 
BAC, in 1999 (Altman 1999); Johnson worked with MAC in 1998 and 1999, 
and returned to Maningrida in 2000; 
• the Maningrida region is very remote and provides some important contrasts 
with the Warrnambool (Madden 2000) and Port Augusta (Gray & Thacker 
2000) cases and other case studies undertaken by CAEPR (Smith 1994, 
1995, 1996) in ‘settled’ regions; and 
• the BAC CDEP is one of the nation’s largest with 512 participants, about 300 
of whom are classified as residing at outstations and 200 in the town; BAC’s 
1999–2000 CDEP budget is about $6.5m per annum. 
In undertaking research such as that reported here, it can be difficult to define 
just who the stakeholders in, and owners of, the research really are. Initially, 
Altman negotiated research access with BAC and sought some funding support 
for the project. BAC was extremely supportive and provided a full-time research 
assistant, Victoria Johnson, for about five weeks at BAC expense, and all BAC 
staff collaborated openly in the research (see acknowledgments). Similarly, a 
number of Maningrida-based organisations collaborated with the project, in part 
because of long-standing research relationships with the researchers. It is 
noteworthy that some of the issues raised by this research and discussed with 
BAC are informing debate about possible change within the organisation and its 
membership. 
This Discussion Paper is structured, by and large, to allow some comparison with 
two other studies undertaken by CAEPR researchers in 2000, in Port Augusta 
and Warnambool. Policy issues and recommendations are roughly divided into 
those of particular relevance to BAC, ATSIC, and government more generally. As 
with all policy-oriented academic research it is difficult to target many audiences 
simultaneously. Even BAC is divided into members, CDEP participants, executive 
board, management and other staff; and several of these categories overlap. 
Similarly, ATSIC incorporates both regional and national interests, and elected 
members and staff. It is hoped that the findings of this research are of relevance 
to all BAC stakeholders, as well as to other Maningrida-based organisations and 
to governments and their agencies beyond ATSIC. 
Methodology and the collection of the data 
The choice of the Maningrida region as the case study site provided opportunity 
for collecting a considerable body of data in a relatively short period: more indeed 
than can be analysed and reported on here. Sources of research data included: 
• the literature and especially the historic literature about Maningrida and its 
outstations, and earlier consultants’ reports (e.g. Gillespie 1999; KPMG 
1999a, 1999b); 
• secondary statistical data from the 1996 Census; 
• file material held by BAC and other Maningrida-based organisations and the 
ATSIC regional office in Darwin; 
4 ALTMAN AND JOHNSON 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
• information collected from a relatively random selection of CDEP scheme 
participants via a questionnaire and formal and informal interview; 
• information collected from almost all supervisors via a questionnaire (often 
self-administered) and interview; and 
• feedback received from both policy and program ATSIC staff and from BAC 
and staff of other Maningrida organisations at three seminars conducted in 
Darwin and Maningrida. 
Altman visited Maningrida for four days early in June 2000, worked with Johnson 
to interview many key CDEP scheme stakeholders, including most supervisors, 
and negotiated a work schedule for Johnson to complete by mid July. Johnson 
then: 
• collected time sheets for all CDEP projects to assess the extent of earned ‘top 
up’ hours worked beyond the minimum base of 18 hours per week; 
• administered a questionnaire (see Appendix 1) to between 30 and 50 
participants; this questionnaire was initially identical to that used in both 
Port Augusta and Warrnambool, but was then modified for local 
circumstances with assistance from BAC management and staff;1 
• administered a second brief questionnaire to as many supervisors as 
possible; 
• conducted a brief overview of the contemporary Maningrida economy with an 
emphasis on employment provided by all Maningrida-based agencies; 
• obtained data from Centrelink about participants in the region and the 
operation of the new $20.00 per fortnight ‘top up’; 
• obtained data on employment exits from the CDEP scheme in last 12 
months, that is in 1999–2000; 
• obtained information about BAC planning, administration, and performance 
reporting in relation to the CDEP scheme it administers; 
• obtained information about the links between the CDEP scheme and artists 
assisted by MAC; 
• assessed the extent to which the CDEP scheme payroll system was used to 
ensure wages deduction to meet participants’ expenditure obligations like 
housing rent; 
• assessed the extent to which the CDEP scheme was used to facilitate savings 
via so-called ‘truck accounts’ (see later); and 
• investigated the links between the CDEP scheme and training. 
A great deal of data had been collected by Johnson by the time Altman returned 
in July. This allowed the researchers then to focus on additional data collection, 
clarification of ambiguities, additional questionnaire-based interviews (especially 
at an outstation and at a seasonal camp), and visits to six outstations in western 
Arnhem Land. Some people at Maningrida suggested that the focus on the area 
west of Maningrida reflected Altman’s regional research bias, and this comment is 
valid. However, the questionnaire (see Appendix 1) had proved very ineffective as 
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an instrument in the outstation context, and it was therefore considered judicious 
to attempt an informal discussion of CDEP issues with Aboriginal research 
collaborators who had known Altman for many years. 
The report on these data forms the bulk of the empirical findings presented below, 
although the order in which information was gathered is not strictly adhered to in 
the presentation. Altman also had the opportunity to collect information at the 
ATSIC Regional Office in Darwin; indeed ATSIC provided open access to all file 
material, as did BAC. This willingness to collaborate in the research contributed 
to a strong sense that there is widespread concern about the future of the CDEP 
scheme—a concern born of the great significance of CDEP to ATSIC, and to many 
other organizations and thousands of individuals throughout Australia. 
Economic and social context 
The Maningrida region is an arbitrarily defined administrative area of some 
10,000 km2 in central Arnhem Land, about 500 km east of Darwin. Maningrida is 
a service township that was established by Northern Territory Welfare Branch fiat 
in 1957. The region is devoid of a commercial economic base: formal employment 
is largely limited to work for a small number of Maningrida-based regional service 
and not-for-profit organizations, and the CDEP scheme. While there are a number 
of embryonic enterprises in the region, some run as joint ventures, the most 
significant exports are cultural products marketed via MAC, now generating over 
$0.6m per annum. While this is not an insignificant amount, it does indicate very 
starkly how devoid the region is of a commercial economic base. Most foodstuffs 
and manufactured goods are imported from Darwin and sold through two retail 
outlets in the township. A feature of the regional economy, historically 
documented in the literature, is the regular exploitation of the relatively abundant 
fish and resources for domestic consumption, especially at outstations (see 
Altman 1987; Meehan 1982). 
In formal terms, the available official statistics provide a useful, but very 
incomplete, snapshot of the regional population and economy. Information from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) contained in the 1996 Census appears 
to reflect on-the-ground economic reality fairly accurately, although the quality 
and utility of social data are limited. Some of the Census information that focuses 
on the Indigenous component of the regional population is summarised in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 reveals some interesting features that can be summarised as follows. 
First, the regional Aboriginal population is said to total about 1,716, with 1,195 
in Maningrida and 521 at 30 recognised outstations. It is possible that there was 
a degree of under-numeration at outstations: for example, in 1998 Altman (1998: 
39) estimated that there was a usual outstation population of 730, with an 
occupation index population (usual population adjusted by proportion of the year 
at outstations) of 653. The population of both Maningrida and the outstations is 
typically youthful (>40% under 15 years old), but surprisingly the dependency 
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ratio (persons aged 15–64 to total population) at outstations (94%) is somewhat 
higher than at Maningrida (76%), reflecting the relative absence of people of prime 
working age at outstations. 
Table 1. Salient features of the regional Indigenous population in 
Maningrida township and outstations, 1996 Census 
 Maningrida Outstations 
 number % number % 
Demography     
Total persons 1195 100 521 100 
0–14 494 41 228 44 
15–44 601 50 204 39 
45–64 78 7 65 12 
65+ 22 2 24 5 
Median age 19  18  
Dependency ratio 76.0 94.0 
Education     
Attending an educational institution 384  191  
Never attended school 27  39  
Language     
Speak Aboriginal language(s) (aged 
5+) 
958  457  
Speak English only (aged 5+) 39  0  
Labour force status (aged 15+)     
Employed CDEPa 221 32 197 69 
Employed other 89 13 3 1 
Unemployed 33 5 12 4 
Not in the labour force 338 50 73 26 
Total 681 100 285 100 
Unemployment rate  9.6  5.7 
Labour force participation rate  50.4  74.4 
Income     
Median individual income (weekly) $183  $180  
Mean individual income (weekly) $199  $166  
Note: (a) The ABS tables state that CDEP data were collected in the Census for the first time in 1996 and that 
these data should be interpreted cautiously (Altman & Gray 2000). 
Source:  Table IA3109 Maningrida and IA3110 Maningrida outstations, 1996 Census. 
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The labour force data probably reflect economic realities better than ever before 
owing to the inclusion of a specific CDEP employment question. This indicates 
that the bulk of employment was in the CDEP scheme. Indeed there were only 89 
non-CDEP jobs held by Aboriginal people in Maningrida and three at outstations. 
This suggests that without CDEP employment, and assuming no substitution 
between mainstream and CDEP employment, the unemployment rate at 
outstations (which is 5.7% according to the census) would approach 100 per cent, 
while at Maningrida (where it is 9.6% according the census) it would approach 90 
per cent.2 
Median individual incomes for persons aged over 15 years are almost identical at 
Maningrida and the outstations, but according to the census do not far exceed 
the CDEP base rate of about $160.00 per week in 1996. However, the mean 
income figure is higher in Maningrida than at outstations by about $20.00 per 
week. This reflects the greater availability of full-time employment and CDEP ‘top 
up’ opportunities in town. Indications are, if art and craft income and access to 
subsistence foodstuffs are taken into account, that those at outstations are better 
off in economic terms than people on CDEP in Maningrida. CDEP participation 
rates are higher and the unemployment rate is lower at outstations. This does not 
reflect a more robust labour market at outstations (there is almost none) but 
rather a greater penetration of the CDEP scheme. This in turn is a reflection in 
part of the historic genesis of CDEP at outstations and its administration by an 
outstation-focused agency that ensures a more widespread coverage in the 
hinterland than in the township. 
Table 2 (see over) draws some comparisons between the Indigenous and non-
Indigenous components of the Maningrida population. This excercise is limited to 
Maningrida because, according to the 1996 Census, there were no non-
Indigenous people residing at outstations. 
There is a very marked difference between these two populations. The non-
Indigenous population is small at 111, but its median age is much higher, the 
dependency ratio is abnormally low (at 17%), and its unemployment rate is zero. 
This population has migrated to Maningrida for employment, and many 
dependants are away at boarding schools in Darwin and elsewhere. Equally 
interesting is the extremely high non-Indigenous participation rate of 96 per cent. 
There is a very marked contrast in median individual incomes, with the non-
Indigenous median being 3.6 times the Indigenous median. Unfortunately, 
because of the small number of non-Indigenous people in Maningrida, concern 
with issues of confidentiality means that the ABS does not release enough census 
data to allow the calculation of mean individual income. Nevertheless the data on 
the median income levels suggests that 6 per cent of the Maningrida regional 
population (the non-Indigenous) has about 33 per cent of regional purchasing 
power as measured by cash income. This point, to which we return below, is 
highlighted primarily to indicate a possible duality in the regional labour market. 
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Table 2. Some salient Indigenous and non-Indigenous comparisons, 
Maningrida, 1996 Census 
 Indigenous Non-Indigenous 
 number %  number % 
Demography      
Total persons 1195   111  
Median age 19   35  
Dependency ratio  76.0   16.8 
Labour force status      
Employed CDEP 221 32  0 0 
Employed other 89 13  87 96 
Unemployed 33 5  0 0 
Not in the labour force 338 50  4 4 
Total 681 100  91 100 
Unemployment rate  9.6   0.0 
Participation rate  50.4   95.6 
Income      
Median individual income $183 $661 
It is interesting to compare some of the 1996 Maningrida township data with data 
collected in a survey of the township in 1980 (Altman 1982: 431–63). At that 
earlier time, the population of the township was estimated at 679, with a further 
660 people living at 22 occupied outstations. The regional Indigenous population 
has grown from about 1,340 to about 1,740 (including the ‘ethnicity unstated’ 
category) at an average growth rate of 1.9 per cent per annum, close to the 
Northern Territory Indigenous rate. The proportion of the regional population 
residing in the township appears to have increased. While both population counts 
were conducted at a similar time of year (July–August) different methodologies 
were used. The 1980 survey employed a team of Aboriginal health workers, and 
probably numerated population by usual place of residence more effectively than 
did the 1996 Census. 
The employment and income statistics also make interesting comparisons. In 
1980, of 147 jobs (including some that were part-time), 46 (31%) were held by 
non-Aboriginal people. In the 1996 Census the proportion held by non-Aboriginal 
people had increased to about 50 per cent, and in 2000 it is estimated that this 
proportion has increased again, probably to 70 per cent. The reasons for this 
significant decline in Aboriginal employment are complex and will be discussed 
further below. In 1980 it was estimated that mean non-Aboriginal income was 
nearly three times the average figure for Aboriginal people, and the 1996 Census 
suggests that this differential (at least in median income) may have increased. 
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The origins and organisational identity of the Bawinanga 
Aboriginal Corporation 
BAC was incorporated as an ORA in 1979. It evolved from the Maningrida 
Outstation Resource Centre that had operated as an organisational arm of the 
Maningrida Council in the late 1970s (see Gillespie, Cooke, & Bond 1977). During 
its first decade, BAC’s activities were focused primarily, but not exclusively, on 
the delivery of services to its members residing at outstations in the Maningrida 
hinterland. These services included primarily assistance with access to welfare 
income,3 provision of rudimentary infrastructure including simple housing, bush 
airstrips, water reticulation and some communications, and the provision of 
mechanical services via a Maningrida-based workshop. BAC also assisted and 
represented its members in a number of cultural and land-related issues: it 
provided the principal mechanism for outstation people in the region to articulate 
their political concerns, mainly about land management issues. From the outset 
BAC also included Maningrida Arts and Crafts (now MAC) among its 
responsibilities. This arts marketing organisation served all artists in the 
Maningrida region, not just those at outstations. A structural weakness of BAC, 
in regional Aboriginal political terms, is that it is located in Maningrida on the 
land of local traditional owners, the Dukurrudji, while its service charter is 
oriented to people residing in the hinterland. 
In its second decade, from 1989, BAC has grown very quickly in organisational 
scale, and its identity and range of activities have altered quite dramatically. It is 
now recognised as a significant and complex regional organisation (KPMG 1999a: 
30) and over the last decade it has evolved to become the largest and most 
powerful administrative institution in the Maningrida region (Altman 1998: 5). 
This is not the appropriate context to provide a detailed analysis of the 
development and current structure of BAC. The organisation has prepared its 
first annual comprehensive narrative annual report (for 1999–2000: BAC 2000), 
extending for the first time beyond detailed audited financial statements. 
However, a synopsis that places BAC in the context of its role as a major CDEP 
organisation is required here, primarily because the one factor that has most 
fundamentally influenced BAC’s growth over the last decade has been the gradual 
introduction of the CDEP scheme. Financial information provided by ATSIC for 
the eight years from 1990–91 to 1997–98 in the context of the National ORA 
Review indicates this growth very clearly. 
The data in Table 3 (see over) clearly demonstrate the growth of BAC at least in 
terms of program funding income from ATSIC. Information in Table 4 (p.12) 
demonstrates how this grant funding has been used to expand the overall 
activities of BAC including its trading arm. These data also demonstrate just how 
significant the CDEP scheme has become in grants income terms, with 72 per 
cent overall deriving from CDEP. However, it should be noted that of this the bulk 
(53% of income) was in the form of wages grants to be paid to CDEP participants. 
As we shall see below, the method BAC has devised to pay participants has 
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resulted in much of this wages grant being paid out as income support to 
outstation residents. 
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IHANTb       390 390 780 1.6 
NAHS/HIPPc       5280  5280 11.1 
Public affairs     5    5 0.0 
Total $2739 $4186 $5166 $5327 $6163 $5691 $10963 $7453 $47689 99.9 
Notes: (a) Some of this funding, especially NAHS/HIPP in 1996–97, was earmarked for BAC members but 
administered by the large project management firm Ove Arup. Financial data in this format not 
available for 1998–99 and 1999–2000. (b) Indigenous Housing Authority of the Northern Territory. (c) 
National Aboriginal Health Strategy and Health Infrastructure Priority Program. 
Source:  ATSIC Jabiru Regional Office, Darwin. 
It is not just the growth of the CDEP scheme that has influenced the changing 
nature and scale of BAC. As noted in a report on ORAs in western Arnhem Land 
generally (Altman 1998), over the last two decades the overall quality of housing 
and infrastructure, roads, airstrips, and communications at outstations have all 
improved markedly. Twenty years ago most outstations relied on short-wave 
Codan transceivers for communications, whereas today most have telephones. 
Reticulated water was rare and ablution facilities were non-existent, whereas 
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today they are the norm. Houses were made of corrugated iron, and even stringy-
bark, on simple wooden frames, and floors were earthen, whereas today houses 
are built on concrete slabs to cyclone-proof standards, and are constructed of 
locally-manufactured bricks to appropriate design specifications (Altman 1998: 
28).4 Similarly, the very seasonal regional road network then consisted of formed 
vehicle tracks, whereas today many roads are surveyed and engineered, river 
crossings are concreted, and road access to Maningrida is much less vulnerable 
to the vagaries of the seasons. These fundamental changes in the Maningrida 
region have been largely funded by government, but the funding conduit has 
usually been BAC; and the consultative and administrative capability to deliver 
such services and maintain them has also been almost entirely provided by BAC. 
The service efficacy of BAC, underwritten primarily by ATSIC in the 1990s, has 
fundamentally altered the balance in physical quality of life between Maningrida 
and its outstations—between town and country. In the 1970s, when people re-
occupied their traditional lands, they surrendered access to almost all the 
trappings of modern Australian living. The township offered better access to 
housing and infrastructure, even if it was allocated unevenly. Today, many 
outstations have housing and infrastructure that is equal to—if not better than—
that of the township. 
These developments, combined with the increase in organisational scale and 
capacity provided by the growth of the CDEP scheme, have also fundamentally 
altered BAC in a number of ways. First, even as a service delivery agency, it has 
had to develop a light industrial capacity in Maningrida to provide more 
sophisticated housing and infrastructure at outstations. Second, the ORA has 
become a CDEP organisation, with much of its administrative capacity and 
managerial effort focused on running this program for over 500 participants. 
Third, in part as a consequence of its institutional capacity and in part as a 
means to finance its activities, BAC has increasingly become a regional economic 
development agency running commercial business enterprises. There is no clear 
organisational delineation between these three broad categories of activity: 
outstation service agency (including political representation on land management 
issues), CDEP organisation, and development agency. And CDEP scheme 
administration and capital funding and CDEP labour is intertwined in each of 
these organisational elements. 
This is very evident in BAC’s consolidated income and expenditure statements for 
the period 1995–96 to 1997–98, and in its consolidated profit and loss 
statements. These are used in Table 4 to calculate the contribution of CDEP 
scheme income and other grant and trading income to the organisation. To some 
extent, Table 4 demonstrates the proportional division of BAC: its CDEP scheme 
income is clearly of the greatest significance (CDEP organisation), followed in turn 
by trading income (development corporation) and then other grant income (service 
delivery agency). This suggests that, at least in financial terms, BAC is primarily a 
CDEP organisation. This view is reinforced in part by the proportional breakdown 
of figures on BAC employees, with the majority being funded by CDEP recurrent 
grants and being engaged to supervise CDEP projects. Importantly though, as will 
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be shown below, a high proportion of BAC’s town-based CDEP workforce is also 
engaged both in its trading and in its service delivery activities. 
Table 4. BAC consolidated financial accounts and the CDEP scheme, 
1995–96 to 1999–2000a 
Income (Sm) 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000 
Grant income      
CDEP wages 3.32 3.69 4.84 4.89 4.99 
CDEP recurrent 0.68 0.66 0.84 0.81 0.91 
CDEP capital 0.49 0.38 0.84 0.68 0.57 
CDEP total 4.49 4.73 6.52 6.41 6.47 
ORA operational 0.28 0.26 0.36 0.31 0.31 
MAC grant 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.15 
NT Housing and Local Govt 0.24 0.18 0.22 0.13 0.13 
NAHS/HIPP/IHANT 0.48 0.00 1.48 1.09 1.31 
Other housing 0.84 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Miscellaneous grants 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.26 
Total grant income 6.67 5.35 8.52 8.24 9.06 
Trading income      
Arts and culture income 0.33 0.38 0.37 0.53 0.65 
BAC fuel 0.81 0.99 1.12 0.86 0.94 
BAC Trust Accountb 1.18 0.69 0.94 1.97 0.16 
BAC Workshop 0.43 0.66 0.65 0.48 0.68 
BAC Tucker Run    0.20 1.89 
Total trading incomec 2.75 2.72 3.08 4.53 6.97 
Total income  9.42 8.07 11.74 13.15 16.03 
Total expenses 8.47 8.91 10.38 12.09 15.21 
Profit 0.93 -0.84 1.33 1.06 0.82 
CDEP: Total income (%)  48  59  61  53 40 
Trading: Total income (%)  29  34  27  34 43 
Balance: Total income (%)  23  7  12  13 17 
Notes: (a) Rounding errors are due to reduction to two decimal places and variability in accounting 
conventions owing to engagement of different staff. Totals are consistent with audited financial statements. 
(b) Owing to changes in accounting conventions by BAC a number of new income-earning activities are included 
here. (c) Some miscellaneous trading income is included here. 
Source: BAC annual audited financial statements. 
One important feature revealed by Table 4 is the rapid increase in total CDEP 
income between 1996–97 and 1997–98. This increase reflects the relocation of the 
Maningrida Council’s CDEP scheme, with 115 participants, to BAC, increasing 
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the overall size of BAC’s CDEP scheme by 20 per cent. This action, taken by 
ATSIC in close consultation with BAC, occurred as a result of financial and 
administrative difficulties experienced by the Council at that time. This decision, 
which was reviewed by ATSIC in 1999 (and endorsed at least for a further 12 
months), has created residual inter-agency tensions in the township, most overtly 
between members of the non-Indigenous staff and management. 
The changing nature of BAC as an organisation has been noted in a number of 
reports now including Altman (1998), ATSIC (1996), Gillespie (1999), and KPMG 
(1999a). KPMG (1999a) in particular has highlighted the vulnerability of BAC to 
any policy changes that result in a reduction in grant funding, especially of 
CDEP. KPMG have also noted that to comply with ATSIC grant conditions, BAC 
must incorporate its growing business enterprises separately, as such businesses 
should carried out by corporate entities other than the grantee. KPMG (1999a) 
assessed BAC as well-managed and it is clearly operating profitably (see Table 4). 
Nonetheless, using an ATSIC template, KPMG classified BAC as a high risk 
organisation and recommended the development of a strategy to cope with the 
grant income loss that will occur when the Maningrida Council component of the 
scheme is repatriated to that organisation. 
A large number of important issues, including governance, management and 
incorporation structures, strategic and succession planning, and reporting and 
accountability, have now been comprehensively addressed for BAC in two 
consultancy reports by Gillespie (1999, 2000). This is not the place to comment 
on BAC’s need to reform quickly to make its corporate structure fit its wide-
ranging operations. Rather, attempts will be made below to focus, perhaps a little 
artificially, on CDEP issues. 
The BAC CDEP: An explanatory and exploratory overview 
Understanding the overall workings of the BAC CDEP scheme today is a complex 
task even for experienced researchers familiar with the Maningrida regional 
economy. This complexity is a result of a number of historical, organisational, 
structural and cultural factors, and their interactions. 
Historically, as Table 3 demonstrates, the scheme has grown quite rapidly 
throughout the 1990s to a point where, since 1997–98, BAC has an allocation of 
512 participants. With entries and exits (or ‘churning’) the actual number of 
participants always greatly exceeds this on an annual basis. As a program, the 
CDEP scheme has had a degree of dynamism, or instability, over the past five 
years, in part as a result of cuts to the ATSIC budget in the 1996–97 
Commonwealth budget and in part as a result of ATSIC’s response to the Spicer 
review of the scheme (Spicer 1997). The one element of the scheme that has 
remained relatively constant is the wages component paid at a per participant 
rate. This is due to the direct funding nexus with the Newstart Allowance rate, 
which means that it is non-discretionary. The other two components of the 
scheme, termed operational (or recurrent) and capital, are more discretionary as 
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they are allocated by ATSIC regional councils and can fluctuate from year to year. 
Together, operational and capital funds are referred to as CDEP ‘on-costs’. In 
1998, in the aftermath of Spicer and in an attempt to encourage CDEP 
organisations to plan, the option of triennial funding was introduced. BAC 
participated in this process and for the period 1998–99 to 2000–01 has negotiated 
a relatively stable CDEP budget with the ATSIC Jabiru Regional Office (based in 
Darwin) which has been endorsed by the ATSIC Regional Council. In Table 5, a 
proportional breakdown of CDEP grant income into wages, operational, and 
capital components, based on BAC financial accounts, is provided. It can be seen 
that in recent years there has been some fluctuation in operational and capital 
grants, but for the period 1998–99 to 1999–2000 this has stabilised considerably. 
Table 5. CDEP grant income by financial year, 1995–96 to 1999–2000 
Income ($m) 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000 
CDEP wages 3.32 3.69 4.84 4.89 4.99 
% of total CDEP 73.90 78.00 74.20 76.30 77.00 
CDEP recurrent 0.68 0.66 0.84 0.81 0.91 
% of total CDEP 15.10 13.90 12.90 12.60 14.00 
CDEP capital 0.49 0.38 0.84 0.68 0.58 
% of total CDEP 10.90 8.00 12.90 10.60 9.00 
Total CDEP 4.49 4.73 6.52 6.41 6.48 
Source: BAC annual audited financial statements. 
Historically, the incorporated structure of BAC precedes the introduction of the 
CDEP scheme, and CDEP has been integrated, by and large, into the pre-existing 
BAC structure. This is primarily because, as a service organisation that 
undertakes a range of activities, BAC engages a significant proportion of its CDEP 
participants across these activities. However, BAC is a dynamic, organic 
organisation, and consequently both the range of services it provides and the 
enterprises it engages in have changed over time. In its role as a CDEP 
organisation, it has participants distributed across 26 outstation timesheets 
(although some include more than one outstation) and up to 31 projects. A 
complicating factor here is that a number of these projects are effectively 
administered by other organisations, although CDEP participant schedules (now 
consolidated into one electronic database called CDEPManager) remain the 
ultimate responsibility of BAC. 
Structural complexities occur at a number of levels. First, the CDEP scheme is 
broadly separated into outstation and township components. At outstations, 
participant or community activities are not planned or monitored, and 
participants receive a standard 36 hours CDEP pay per fortnight. Here, the CDEP 
scheme is operating as a minimum income support scheme, little different from 
Newstart Allowance or Parenting Payment (which are also available at 
outstations). It is assumed, and has been empirically verified, that while at 
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outstations participants (and others) undertake a range of formal and informal 
activities, predominantly the production of art and craft for sale (mainly through 
MAC) and the production of subsistence foodstuffs for domestic consumption. The 
major reason why CDEP operates in this way at outstations is that a combination 
of limited supervisory resources and difficult and expensive communications with 
scattered outstation communities makes accurate planning and monitoring 
impossible. It has been tried in the past, but not in the last three years. But 
because hunting and gathering is undertaken it is also felt to be unnecessary to 
monitor ‘work’ that is clearly occurring. 
On the other hand, the township component of the scheme is administered 
primarily on a project basis, with participants recruited because they express an 
interest in a particular project. There are key differences in the administration of 
the scheme in the township. First, time sheets that reflect to varying degrees 
actual hours worked are maintained. Variation is primarily a product of how 
supervisors choose to interpret and negotiate the ‘no work, no pay’ rule with 
CDEP participants in each project. Second, in the township, additional hours 
beyond the standard 18 hours per week per participant provided by ATSIC can be 
worked, if the resources are available. The availability of these resources, 
universally termed ‘top up’, varies markedly between projects. Third, projects are 
variably defined by supervisors, participants, and funding agencies. A number of 
projects include significant formal training components funded by the 
Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB) 
under its Indigenous Employment Program (IEP) and are regarded primarily as 
training. Others see participants engaged in enterprises. In yet other situations, 
the CDEP scheme provides a form of wage subsidy both to BAC (in part for CDEP 
administration) and to other agencies like the health centre and school. These 
organisations then ‘top up’ participant wages with their own discretionary funds, 
sometimes to create full-time jobs. As noted above, since 1997–98, BAC has also 
administered the Maningrida Council’s CDEP allocation and a number of 
Maningrida-based participants who come historically from this council ‘block’ of 
115 undertake ‘municipal’ activities. 
This structural division between town and country creates problems for effective 
administration of the scheme. The main problem is the mobility of individual 
CDEP participants. When outstation people come to live in Maningrida they 
remain on outstation time sheets and continue to receive CDEP ‘wages’ for 36 
hours per fortnight as if they were actively engaged in outstation activities. On the 
other hand, if a person on a Maningrida project time sheet goes to reside at an 
outstation for a period, they face the possibility that they will not receive any 
CDEP wages. Similarly, within Maningrida there are problems associated with the 
variable interpretation of the ‘no work, no pay’ rule by project supervisors which 
in turn result in variability in participants’ commitment to work and to projects. 
Increasingly in Maningrida BAC has attempted to apply the ‘no work, no pay’ rule 
more rigorously and to encourage those who regard CDEP participation as income 
support rather than employment or training to seek ‘passive welfare’ from 
Centrelink. This strategy is also being extended increasingly to non-working 
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spouses in the township. For those who do not want to work at least 36 hours per 
fortnight on CDEP there is no financial incentive to stay on the scheme, although 
as we discuss later, other benefits flow from CDEP scheme participation. 
Cultural complications abound and many of these will be addressed in greater 
detail later in the discussion of the CDEP ‘sociology of work’. The main issues that 
require emphasis at this point are mobility, and the effects of cultural events and 
the seasonal weather cycle. The regional population is highly geographically 
mobile, both within the region, between town and country, and between the 
Maningrida region and elsewhere. This creates administrative problems for BAC 
especially as ATSIC now requires daily accounting for all CDEP scheme 
participants. The 1996 Census enumerated a regional ‘place of residence’ 
population of about 1,700, but health clinic records suggest that the de jure 
regional population that regards the Maningrida region as ‘home’ is larger by 
several hundred, and possibly numbers as many as 2,400. Migration of people in 
and out of the region results in constant changes in participant schedules 
(although outstation schedules are remarkably stable). Population movement also 
creates tensions between different categories of participants owing to the 
apparently favourable treatment of outstation participants when in town. 
Cultural ‘events’, and especially ceremonial activities, influence people’s 
availability for CDEP project work. While attempts are made to accommodate 
ceremonial participation, it creates problems for the administration of projects 
and training. The seasonal cycle compounds the effects of these cultural factors: 
during the middle of the dry and especially during school holidays in July there is 
an annual migration to outstations. Conversely, during the wet there is a growth 
in the Maningrida township population. Seasonality influences the effectiveness of 
particular projects: for example, the road crew does not operate during the wet 
and activities relating to outstation essential service maintenance and housing 
and infrastructure provision are severely constrained. 
These complicating factors, which comprise the lived reality in the Maningrida 
region, mean that the nature of participation in CDEP, especially in projects, is 
relatively fluid. There is much participant ‘churning’. This makes long-term 
analysis in the township extremely difficult. The projects recorded during the 
research visits in June and July 2000 included those listed in Table 6. 
In marked contrast to outstations, people on township project timesheets had 
various forms of ‘no work, no pay’ rule applied to them. In analysing what was 
regarded as a typical fortnight’s time sheet for February 2000 we found that in 
town on average people were paid a base CDEP pay of 29 hours per fortnight, but 
then averaged about two hours top up. Thus, they were paid for 31 hours a 
fortnight. In addition, a number of CDEP positions were ‘topped up’ to full-time 
administrative positions, with resources coming from CDEP savings or the CDEP 
operational budget.  
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Nature of activity 
BAC specific projects    
1. BAC Ranger project  19  18 Land management, wildlife 
harvesting, feral animal control 
2. BAC Builders  1  1 Assist in housing R & Ma 
3. BAC Workshop  3  3 Assist in mechanical workshop 
4. Builder’s Workshop   1  1 Assist in construction of R&M 
infrastructure for outstations 
5. BAC Tucker run  2  2 Assist in sale of goods to 
outstation residents and 
others 
6. BAC Outstation 
builders 
 3  3 Assist in housing R&M at 
outstations 
7. BAC Mud brick  14  14 Operate a mud-brick 
manufacturing plant 
8. MAC  7  6 Assist in the documentation, 
display and packaging of art 
9. BAC Fuel  1  1 Assist in fuel sales 
10. BAC Office  13  9 Assist in the administration of 
CDEP especially data entry 
11. BAC Road crew  2  2 Assist in outstation road 
maintenance 
12. BAC Dependent 
spouses (in town) 
 18  18 Use of CDEP for income 
support 
BAC-run projects    
13. Municipal services 
(4 teams) 
 38  31 Assist in town maintenance 
activities in a number of work 
crews 
14. Council garbage  5  5 Collect township garbage 
15. Council plant   7  7 Operate plant/maintain 
township tip 
16. Council spouses  18  15 Use of CDEP for income 
support 
17. Horticulture  5  4 Assist in plant propagation 
18. Women’s centre  8  8 Partake in a range of 
homemaking activities, print 
workshops, etc 
Outsourced projects    
19. Council building  3  2 Assist Council in housing R&M 
Table 6 continues on following page 
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Nature of activity 
20. Council painting  3  3 Assist Council in house 
painting 
21. Sports and 
recreation 
 3  3 Maintain Maningrida Oval, 
recreational facilities, run 
sports activities 
22. Council road crew  2  2 Assist in Maningrida road 
maintenance 
23. Council   7  4 Assist Maningrida Council 
24. Council workshop  4  3 Assist the Council mechanic 
25. MPAb  3  3 Apprentices with MPA builders 
26. JET Centre  2  2 Assist in providing training 
programs, especially driving 
27. Centrelink  1  1 Assist the Centrelink Office 
28. School  7  4 Assist at Maningrida school 
29. Health clinic  6  6 Assist the Maningrida health 
workers 
Total  207  174  
Note: (a) Repair and maintainance. (b) Maningrida Progress Association. 
The analysis of the data presented thus far allows some summary comments 
about the nature of the BAC CDEP. CDEP scheme participants have penetrated 
all sections of the township labour market, a phenomenon also observed at other 
remote Indigenous communities (see Taylor, Bern, & Senior (2000) for Ngukurr). 
Indeed the only major employer in Maningrida that made no direct use of CDEP 
labour was the police force. The Maningrida Progress Association (MPA) makes no 
use of CDEP labour in its retail activities, preferring instead to pay people a high 
wage rate but maintaining a strict time sheet that records actual work. A number 
of Maningrida-based institutions like the school and health clinic value highly the 
CDEP participants that they are allocated, seeing them as an additional resource 
that would never be provided from mainline agencies. 
There is clearly an inequity in the administration of CDEP between ‘town’ and 
‘country’. Originally, BAC attempted to run outstation CDEPs on a project basis 
with nominal outstation work plans, but providing supervision was heavily 
vehicle-dependent, expensive, and administratively impossible with the staff 
resources available from CDEP operational allocations. 
Economic and social impacts 
The economic and social impacts of CDEP scheme participation can be measured 
in many different ways and from a variety of perspectives. The focus here, 
initially, is on program goals designed to create employment, supplement 
incomes, encourage enterprise, and provide training. Obviously a number of these 
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categories overlap, both in terms of their impact and of their definition as 
economic or social goals. Impacts can also be measured from the perspective of 
individuals or of the wider community—these might be termed the private as 
opposed to the public benefit. These too may overlap. These conceptual 
ambiguities notwithstanding, we attempt an analysis of these impacts in the 
following discussion. 
Income effects 
Making sense of income supplementation for CDEP scheme participants is not an 
easy task, in part because the supplement is not always paid by BAC and in part 
because a variety of data sets exist—usually reflecting different income sources, 
often with different names for the same individual. One also needs to distinguish 
the direct income effects that flow from CDEP employment, from indirect income 
effects that may see benefits accrue to individuals as a result of successful CDEP 
enterprises in which they are not directly involved. Such indirect benefits may 
extend to compensation or royalties paid in recognition of rights based on 
tradition that may be embedded in land rights statute. 
Income supplementation should emerge clearly from payrolls, but measuring it is 
in fact very complex. Take, for example, information provided by BAC for the 
month of June 2000. In that month, BAC had 38 salaried staff of whom four were 
Aboriginal and 34 were non-Aboriginal. None of these staff were paid CDEP. On 
top of this, 549 individuals were paid some CDEP wages, with 386 receiving the 
standard $732.00 for a nominal 72-hour month. The CDEP payroll for June 
indicates that 21 CDEP scheme participants received more than the standard 
$732.00, with a number of supervisors receiving a double allocation of $1,462.00. 
Furthermore, just from the BAC payroll, three additional forms of top up are in 
evidence. 
1. People could work extra hours. For 18 of 42 individuals who worked extra 
hours, income increased above the standard $732.00. But there were still 
24 participants whose ‘top up’ did not take them above the $732.00 
standard suggesting that their absence from work during standard CDEP 
work hours was not offset by work at other times. 
2. A further 26 CDEP participants earned art and craft income in June, and of 
these 22 were able to increase their income from $732.00. This was 
primarily a reflection of their location: on outstation timesheets that amount 
is paid as a standard. 
3. Finally, 26 CDEP participants earned additional income from a variety of 
project accounts and in 17 cases this increased their income above the 
standard CDEP monthly rate.  
All told, of 549 people receiving some CDEP in June 2000, 51 received more than 
the base of $732.00, 356 received the base, and 142 received less than the base 
because they were on project timesheets and worked less than 72 hours. It is 
probable that up to a dozen others working for the Council, the health centre, 
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MPA, and school earned top up that was not paid via BAC. With these additions 
the above-base figure would have increased to about 63 people, just over 10 per 
cent of CDEP scheme participants. In gross payment terms, $359,000 was paid 
via the CDEP account in June and an additional $25,000 by BAC via the various 
options outlined above. The ‘notional’ CDEP entitlements of 512 participants 
totalled $374,000 for the month of June so only an additional $10,000 was 
distributed, to a greater number of participants. Overall, while many had 
opportunities greatly to enhance their earnings, it is notable that few took 
advantage of such opportunities. 
The problem with using only one month’s data may be demonstrated with 
reference to arts and crafts income, which totalled $18,000 in June but averaged 
$40,000 over the 1999–2000 year. A focus on this sector is justified because it is 
the region’s only significant export, with $473,000 being paid to 326 active artists 
in 1999–2000 and art sales of $649,000. There is a marked difference between 
the earnings of 103 active artists on CDEP and 223 who are not, but who work 
instead or receive other income support. On average CDEP artists earned 
$2,594.00 for the year, whereas non-CDEP artists earned $945.00. Of the 103 
CDEP artists, 89 were on outstation timesheets and receiving $732.00 per month 
from CDEP. Earnings from art production supplemented this monthly income, 
over the year, by 23 per cent, which is very significant non-welfare income in a 
context where few other cash earning options were available.5 It is noteworthy 
however that arts marketing was underwritten by an ATSIC grant of $148,500 to 
MAC; it is likely that some outstation artists also sold art via avenues other than 
MAC. 
The crucial issue is whether CDEP scheme participation facilitated this income 
supplementation activity. It seems highly likely that at outstations, where CDEP 
is paid as income support, scheme participation has underwritten arts 
production. While a similar amount might have been produced if artists had been 
receiving Newstart Allowance, the more rigorous income testing requirements of 
welfare (if applied) would have acted as a disincentive for artists to produce. A 
positive feature of the CDEP scheme is that participants can earn ‘top up’ of 
about $17,500.00 per annum, whereas with Newstart Allowance a taper (of 50 
cents in the dollar) applies after $60.00 is earned per fortnight. By contrast, in 
the case of those working on projects in the township, CDEP scheme participation 
may have decreased people’s income below welfare entitlements because they did 
not work the minimum available 3.6 hours per work day. 
Employment effects 
The Spicer Report (1997) highlighted the CDEP scheme’s shortcomings as a 
labour market program: CDEP scheme participation became a final job 
destination in too many situations, and CDEP participants were moving on to 
full-time employment on too few occasions. In an attempt to encourage the 
transition from CDEP to mainstream employment, an element of DEWRSB’s IEP 
launched in 1999 offers CDEP organisations an incentive of $2,000 (now $2,200) 
for every participant that exits into a ‘real job’. 
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In the Maningrida regional context, the CDEP scheme can hardly be regarded as a 
labour market program, if only because the majority of participants reside at 
outstations where there is no labour market. The possibility exists, of course, for 
outstation people to migrate to Maningrida for employment, but few of them have 
work experience and skilling and they are therefore disadvantaged in any 
competition for mainstream employment. In Maningrida itself, the 1996 Census 
showed that there were only 176 people in non-CDEP employment, with 50 per 
cent of these being non-Aboriginal. In June 2000, we quantified about 171 full-
time mainstream jobs in Maningrida, but only about 30 to 40 per cent of these 
were held by Aboriginal people. 
The employment effects of the CDEP scheme can be highly variable. At 
Maningrida in 2000 there have been numerous cases of people exiting CDEP, but 
most have gone onto welfare and some have been encouraged into situations 
where welfare is the more appropriate income support mechanism. There have 
been only two cases of people leaving CDEP to take up mainstream employment, 
and this has required migration away from Maningrida. Furthermore, a number 
of CDEP participants, as outlined above, are able to supplement their part-time 
work allocations to full-time work, most commonly in conjunction with a training 
subsidy or with resources from project funding and enterprise trading income. 
Such CDEP-linked full-time work often occurs on an irregular basis, with periods 
of full-time work alternating with periods of part-time CDEP scheme participation 
over the year. 
Historically, it appears that in the period since the introduction of the CDEP 
scheme into the region in 1989, employment (including the CDEP scheme) has 
officially increased, but in reality participation in non-CDEP or unsubsidised jobs 
has declined. Taylor and Roach (1998) have documented the impact of the CDEP 
scheme for Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory as a whole in the inter-
censal period 1991–96, noting that private sector employment growth had 
negligible impact on the overall employment:population ratio. The CDEP scheme 
was of major significance: it might be that, counter to the expectations of policy 
makers, the CDEP scheme may be a preferred job destination for some Aboriginal 
people. 
In Maningrida, there are indications that with the growth of BAC as a complex 
organisation, the majority of job growth is for qualified non-Aboriginal labour that 
needs to be recruited into the region. This is paradoxical, because BAC is 
attempting to expand the regional economy for the benefit of its membership, but 
it seems at present that suitably skilled and committed Indigenous people are 
either unavailable or disinclined to take up the skilled managerial, administrative, 
and trade positions available. This is a very complex issue, and one that BAC is 
well aware of. It is as if an employment mobility barrier is operating. With growing 
demands for greater external accountability and with initiatives to establish 
increasingly sophisticated enterprises and services, the gap between skills held by 
local Aboriginal people and those required for employment is widening. The 
reasons for this are multi-dimensional and primarily sociological: they are 
discussed further below. 
22 ALTMAN AND JOHNSON 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Enterprise development 
Since the establishment of Maningrida in 1957 there have been many attempts to 
establish labour-intensive industries in the region, in part to create employment 
that is independent of government and in part to expand the regional economy 
and available income. To date, for a variety of locational, resource, and structural 
reasons, most such attempts have failed to prove commercially viable. The CDEP 
scheme provides BAC with some level of financial resourcing to establish 
enterprises, as is shown in Tables 3 and 4. These operational and capital 
resources are intended for ensuring the operation of the CDEP scheme, but some 
have been earmarked in BAC’s current three-year CDEP operational plan for 
enterprise development. Overall, BAC has been relatively successful in 
establishing a number of viable enterprises, as shown by its overall organisational 
profitability and growth. 
The enterprises established are of two main types. The majority are in the services 
sector, and most have been established with CDEP capital and are still 
underwritten by access to CDEP labour. They are thus still dependent on public 
subvention. A number of these enterprises, for example the mechanical workshop 
and arts and crafts marketing, predate the introduction of CDEP, although both 
these have expanded markedly since the scheme’s introduction. More recently, 
BAC has taken over and expanded the only regional fuel outlet and the regional 
outstation retail supply service. Both these enterprises were taken over from the 
MPA. Other enterprises can be classified as import substitution. They include, for 
example, the BAC mud-brick enterprise that produces bricks for house 
construction both in Maningrida and outstations, and more recently, a 
horticultural project that provides plants for purchase by Maningrida and 
outstation residents. Finally there are the export enterprises, the most difficult to 
establish in this remote region. Besides MAC, these include joint-venture 
recreational fishing and safari hunting enterprises and an embryonic venture 
(undertaken by the BAC Djelk Rangers) to commercially harvest wildlife, 
especially crocodile, and to breed crocodile hatchlings. 
These enterprises, all still supported by CDEP capital and labour, have had mixed 
results. In financial terms, BAC Fuel and the BAC ‘tucker run’ are very profitable, 
while the mechanical workshop makes a loss. The import substituting enterprises 
are successful, but are dependent, in part, on CDEP labour. This suggests that 
they may not be commercially viable without the scheme. The export-oriented 
enterprises are very much at an establishment stage and regarded by BAC 
management as longer-term investments. Nevertheless, while only the wildlife 
harvesting generates significant seasonal employment for the rangers, the other 
two enterprises generate income for traditional owners from fishing camp site-
lease payments and visitor fees, and from trophy fees from the safari enterprise. 
These land-use ‘royalties’ are widely distributed to traditional owners; indirectly, 
they have been generated by CDEP scheme activities that have underwritten 
provision of site infrastructure. A new project for the harvesting of indigenous 
flora is currently under way. 
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Service delivery and client services 
One of the critically important benefits generated by the CDEP scheme is the 
institutional capacity that it provides to BAC. Much of this capacity is utilised not 
only to represent members politically, particularly on land-related issues, but also 
to improve the range and quality of services. One of the ways that this is 
facilitated is by agreement within BAC for mandatory deductions to be made from 
the pay of all CDEP participants. Each participant on an outstation timesheet has 
fortnightly deductions for rent ($20.00), for the traditional owners of Maningrida 
($4.00), for a ceremonial (including funeral) fund ($4.00), and to cover the cost of 
electronic banking via an ANZ agency operated by BAC ($4.00). Town-based 
participants have similar deductions except that rent is $40.00 per fortnight 
rather than $20.00. 
The mandatory rental payment, a requirement IHANT that leverages in additional 
repair and maintenance funding, is used to maintain outstation housing. 
Maningrida charges are provided to the Maningrida Council. Other charges allow 
the provision of services on a partial cost-recovery basis. It is likely that without 
the CDEP payroll such mandatory charges (which are also extended to salaried 
staff) could not be enforced. The voluntary redistribution of $50,000 CDEP 
scheme income by the CDEP to the Dukurrudji traditional owners of Maningrida 
is also made by another institution, the MPA, from trading income. 
The facility for arranging payroll deductions has allowed the current BAC 
accountant to institute an effective and popular savings scheme called ‘truck 
accounts’. This is primarily utilised by outstation residents who do not have ready 
access to credit facilities such as the Traditional Credit Union. Truck accounts 
are used in one of two ways: either to save resources to purchase four-wheel-drive 
vehicles from a preferred supplier in Darwin, or to save to pay off truck repair 
bills accrued with the BAC workshop. The system is entirely transparent and 
while participants are not encouraged to use these accounts like the bank 
passbooks of a bygone era, they do have ready access to their savings if needed. 
The amounts that accumulate via this mechanism are significant: in 1999–2000, 
$360,000 was saved via truck accounts and $160,000 was repaid for up-front 
truck maintenance provided by BAC. Since it is mainly outstation people who use 
these savings services, it is possible that as much as 20 per cent of disposable 
CDEP income is saved in this way. The priority given to vehicles at outstations is 
often taken as an indicator of their value as a capital item to assist hunting, 
fishing, and other informal economic activities. Given that the cost of delivered 
bought food at outstations is higher than at Maningrida, the level of saving for 
vehicles suggests that people must be engaging in significant subsistence activity 
that reduces their need for shop-bought food. 
Training 
In an earlier analysis of education and training within ORAs, Altman and Schwab 
(1998) noted that these organisations were not specialist training providers. In the 
past, the CDEP scheme often ran in tandem with the Community Training 
24 ALTMAN AND JOHNSON 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Program (CTP), but ATSIC discontinued this program in late 1996 in a round of 
global funding cutbacks. Since then, most CDEP organisations have run training 
programs on a largely opportunistic basis, either by applying to organisations like 
the Northern Territory Employment and Training Authority (NTETA) for one-off 
training programs or else by including CDEP participants in training programs 
provided by other organisations. 
Since its establishment in 1994, the Maningrida Jobs, Education and Training 
Corporation (Maningrida JET Centre) has been the recognised training authority. 
It was registered to provide vocational education and training in 1995. Since 1998 
it has been recognised as a quality endorsed training organisation. The JET 
Centre is a stand-alone organisation, but works closely with BAC and its CDEP 
scheme. However, not all participants in training courses are CDEP scheme 
participants and not all training in Maningrida is provided via the JET Centre. 
The Maningrida school also provides training and at times other organisations 
negotiate for specific short courses. 
The range of training provided varies considerably, from non-certificate short 
courses (e.g. in mounting bark paintings or screen printing), to certificate courses 
such as operating a forklift or chainsaw, to multi-year courses currently being 
provided to two cohorts in construction and office administration. An important 
feature of the multi-year courses is that they are jointly underwritten by ATSIC 
(via CDEP) and DEWRSB (via Structured Training and Education Projects). 
Training is also provided to CDEP scheme participants on the job or in accredited 
short courses (Campbell 2000). The CDEP scheme is underwriting training, some 
of which could generate real employment (e.g. for office workers and builders 
seeking fully accredited qualifications). A number of Djelk Rangers are also 
undertaking certificates in land management from the Northern Territory 
University, with on-site training provided at the ranger station at Djinkarr. 
Two general observations can be made about the relationship between CDEP and 
training. First, it is generally recognised that training participants come from a 
very low educational base, at least in terms of average attainment levels 
Australia-wide. A number of training courses are provided to participants in basic 
literacy, numeracy, and word processing. Second, no matter how much training is 
undertaken, leaving the CDEP scheme to take up ‘real’ jobs will be dependent on 
Aboriginal people’s aspirations for this form of employment. This issue is 
discussed further below. 
Policy issues for BAC, for ATSIC, and for government 
The discussion so far has been largely descriptive rather than analytical. In this 
section, some problematic policy issues are raised for consideration. To 
summarise the argument to this point, the case has been made that the CDEP 
scheme has a range of economic and social impacts in the Maningrida region. 
Most are positive, but some are unintentionally perverse and negative. In this 
section, we attempt to address these issues as problems amenable to 
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amelioration. It should be noted that these issues were all raised with ATSIC 
stakeholders during two seminars convened in Darwin and at a BAC-sponsored 
seminar held with representatives of almost all agencies (bar the police) in 
Maningrida. 
The identity of BAC CDEP scheme in town and country 
Both a strength and a weakness of the CDEP scheme, noted in the past (Altman 
1990), is its unclear program identity. This is a strength because it enhances 
flexibility, but it is a weakness for an organisation that is eager to introduce a 
consistent set of rules for scheme operations. In the BAC case, there is a clear 
distinction between CDEP in town and country, and a lack of equity in the way 
the scheme is administered in the two, often overlapping, domains. In the 
township, the scheme is generally regarded either as an employment or as a 
training program, whereas at outstations it is clearly viewed as income support. 
Even this clear distinction is not formally made by BAC, and this lack of an 
overarching organisational approach to the scheme can be problematic. For 
example, when outstation people are in Maningrida they receive their ‘normal’ 
CDEP, whereas town-based project workers have a ‘no work, no pay rule’ applied 
to them. 
This lack of clarity leads different regional stakeholders to want the CDEP scheme 
for the wrong reasons. Outstation residents articulate a preference for the scheme 
because it is administratively simple: the periodic paper work required to remain 
on Centrelink’s Newstart Allowance is not required to remain on CDEP, even for 
years continuously. This is likely to become an even stronger reason if 
government mandatory mutual obligation clauses are introduced. This would be a 
rational response, but it could prove problematic if the scheme were to be 
assessed in future as an employment program in such contexts. Town people like 
CDEP scheme participation when it generates a base plus ‘top up’ with extra 
hours: this allows people to earn above the welfare limits available from Newstart 
or pensions. But the scheme is unpopular when a strict ‘no work, no pay’ rule is 
applied and people receive less than their welfare entitlements or less than 
outstation residents who have no such rule applied to them. As a CDEP 
organisation, BAC has become highly dependent on the scheme for relatively 
discretionary resources and as a mechanism for facilitating the collection of 
moneys, like rents. Importantly, there is evidence that BAC is becoming less 
directly dependent on CDEP income over time as its trading activities expand. 
However, most of these activities remain highly dependent on CDEP workers and 
capital, and partially dependent on recycled CDEP revenue being used to 
purchase goods and services. 
Active versus passive welfare 
The research reported here is focused on the CDEP scheme and BAC, but 
information provided by Centrelink in Maningrida indicates that the passive 
welfare economy is of greater overall financial significance in the region than the 
CDEP wages economy. In total, about $6m per annum is paid to pensioners and 
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to Newstart Allowance, Families, and Parenting Payment customers in the region, 
compared to $4.9m in CDEP wages. There are clear tensions evident in 
Maningrida between the ‘active’ welfare administered by BAC and ‘passive’ welfare 
administered by Centrelink. The notional BAC rule ‘no work, no pay’ for CDEP 
projects has been variably applied and difficult to enforce in the township 
alongside a Centrelink welfare regime. This problem has also been noted 
elsewhere by Pearson (2000: 88). Somewhat paradoxically, it is the CDEP 
organisation that is increasingly applying a de facto activity test (‘no work, no pay’ 
in town), while Centrelink does nothing of the sort. 
The existence of passive welfare in the township contributes to the lack of BAC 
consistency in implementing its own ‘no work, no pay’ rule because project 
supervisors are reluctant to leave CDEP participants without any cash income. 
There are growing difficulties in getting participants to work regularly for the base 
CDEP ‘entitlement’ in town (18 hours per week), alongside a requirement that top 
up will be made available from a reduction of the base payments of others. 
Historically, some top up was generated by the quarterly payment of CDEP wages 
for a set number of participants. In 2000, with the introduction of electronic 
acquittal of participants on a daily basis using CDEPManager, there is less ‘wages 
savings’ available for top up. The use of CDEPManager to reduce wage surpluses 
as a source of ‘top up’ has become a critical component of the scheme, and this 
requires careful consideration by ATSIC. 
The relations between BAC and Centrelink are problematic. In particular, it is 
unclear why Centerlink is charged with administering the new and very confusing 
supplement (another ‘top up’) of $20.00 per fortnight to provide a degree of 
financial equality with the mainstream ‘Work for the Dole’ program. This is 
especially confusing for participants who have no idea why this supplement is 
disbursed (to date incompletely). Interestingly, in the Maningrida region the 
CDEPManager data set collected by BAC is far superior to the locally generated 
data set produced by the local Centrelink Office that opened in June 2000. Given 
that BAC is trying to apply payment for hours worked in Maningrida, it is a little 
perverse that the Centrelink top up is provided irrespective of this. It would make 
far more sense for a notional $20.00 per fortnight per participant (or about 
$266,000) to be provided to BAC to use as a ‘top up for hours worked’ pool. 
It is important that the relationship between active and passive welfare is 
carefully examined in contexts where both are available. It is unlikely that the 
past practice of eliminating Newstart Allowances in communities participating in 
the CDEP scheme will be renewed, because ATSIC does not have an open-ended 
wages budget that will allow unrestricted recruitment of all welfare recipients into 
the scheme. Today, growth of participant numbers is curtailed. There also seems 
to be a heightened ATSIC awareness of individual welfare rights (versus 
community development) even though these are currently being challenged 
(McClure 2000). Organisations like BAC are increasingly encouraging passive 
welfare preferers to shift onto Centrelink payments (Manners 2000). 
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The definition of work and the issue of substitution 
CDEP organisations are increasingly defining work in mainstream terms while 
paying lip service to ‘culture work’. In the BAC context a distinction is maintained 
between the two along loose geographic lines—town versus country again. In 
reality, there are two types of CDEP in the region: income support or minimum 
income out bush and CDEP, often with top up, and often as a final job 
destination, in town. People out bush regard CDEP as beneficial because it 
provides work, but in practice there is no difference between the work done by 
CDEP and Newstart participants. Work is defined as ‘cleaning rubbish’ and 
‘cutting grass’, not hunting, fishing, or art manufacture, which are the activities 
that really occur. The need to apply mainstream definitions of work in town is 
linked partly to the absence of sufficient alternative resources to allow for 
adequate service delivery, especially given the relatively low productivity of labour. 
In town, people really are meant to be cutting grass and clearing rubbish while 
engaged on CDEP, because if they do not, these activities are not undertaken. 
In the Maningrida regional context it is clear that the BAC-administered CDEP 
scheme is operating, both directly and indirectly, as a mechanism to provide 
substitution service delivery. This happens directly when workers on CDEP are 
provided to a range of mainline agencies to top up their funded staff positions, as 
at the school or health centre. It also occurs when CDEP labour is used to 
undertake jobs like garbage collection, that other agencies (in this case the 
Maningrida Council), are separately funded to provide. This substitution occurs 
as a result of the failure of mainline Commonwealth and Territory departments 
and agencies to provide resources on a needs-based and rigorously calculated 
basis. Still other Commonwealth agencies, such as DEWRSB, are free-riding 
indirectly on ATSIC-funded organisations. For example, under the IEP, DEWRSB 
is providing some training moneys to BAC. But this provision is contingent on 
trainees receiving their base income from CDEP wages and on BAC accepting an 
additional administrative load. 
Inter-organisational rivalry 
The overall significance of the CDEP scheme in the Maningrida regional economy 
is creating some inter-organisational rivalry. This is partly in response to BAC’s 
evolution over time into a larger organisation with greater economic and political 
power. On one hand, the CDEP workforce has penetrated all sections of the 
township labour market. On the other hand, the availability of CDEP labour and 
capital to BAC enterprises is making them increasingly competitive. This is 
evident, for example, in the current acrimonious relationship between BAC and 
the MPA, the organisation that arguably represents the Maningrida private sector 
since it receives no government funding. There is also some political friction in 
town between BAC and the Maningrida Council, primarily because BAC was 
allocated the Council’s CDEP places two years ago when Council went bankrupt. 
The Council sees a repatriation of its 115 CDEP placements as a means to 
revitalise its precarious financial position, but ATSIC is reluctant to make this 
move until the Council is on a surer administrative and financial footing (see 
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KPMG 1999b). Such rivalry and tension between organisations hampers the high 
degree of collaborative action required to stabilise and develop what in reality is a 
minute regional economy. Unfortunately, such rivalry spills into the Aboriginal 
domain, with different groups having shifting and at times overlapping alliances 
to different institutions. 
Organisational vulnerability 
It is debatable whether BAC is over-reliant on the CDEP scheme. There are 
indications in Table 4 that BAC is becoming less directly dependent on CDEP 
income, but it is uncertain that its enterprises will be commercially viable without 
direct CDEP support. This is partly because demand is inelastic—hence without 
CDEP support prices could rise—and partly because there is limited regional 
competition. BAC is currently in the last year of a funding triennium that has 
delivered relative stability in operational and capital CDEP support. But BAC is 
highly vulnerable to the politics of the ATSIC Regional Council and there is some 
risk that its large size and relative success in recent years will make it especially 
liable to suffer cuts from 2001–02. It is also possible that the return of 115 places 
to the Maningrida Council, with pro-rata cuts in operational and capital support, 
will impact negatively on BAC. However, it is also possible that this would be the 
best institutional arrangement for the Maningrida region. It is important that 
ATSIC recognise the relative stability of support needed for sound economic 
development. The past practice of linking guaranteed triennial funding to 
strategic and business development planning should be maintained. 
Planning, reporting, accountability and feedback 
It is of some concern that BAC has experienced relatively unfettered growth from 
its origins as an outstation resource agency. It has become, in turn, a CDEP 
organisation, and, increasingly, a regional development corporation and service 
delivery agency. This growth has occurred with minimal business or participatory 
planning and with lack of rigorous evaluation of outcomes. It is only in the last 
two years that BAC has been developing a strategic plan (Gillespie 1999, 2000) 
and it is only in 2000 that it is producing, of its own volition, its first narrative 
annual report. 
There is clearly a distinction to be made in CDEP administration between 
financial accountability, which is emphasised, and performance accountability 
that is benchmarked in some way against program goals. Clearly there is 
difficulty in reporting outcomes from the CDEP scheme because of its diversity of 
goals. As organisations like BAC become more complex and elements of its CDEP 
scheme become more enmeshed in its numerous and diverse corporate entities, 
monitoring performance becomes more difficult. But there is also an absence of 
ATSIC feedback when performance indicators are quantified, partly because of a 
lack of capacity to respond in a meaningful and timely manner. While ATSIC  
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flexibility in allowing considerable grant variation over the CDEP funding 
triennium is appropriate, it is important that milestone performance monitoring is 
also conducted. 
Employment generation for whom? 
In the aftermath of the Spicer Report there has been a growing tendency to view 
the CDEP scheme as an employment generating program (see e.g. the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission 2000: 141), something that it clearly is not—
and cannot be—in some contexts. Indeed the view that CDEP is about creating 
jobs in the mainstream can only be maintained in the absence of reality checks 
on what employment is actually available and the particular structural 
circumstances of remote communities. Both ATSIC and BAC express disquiet, for 
different reasons, about the growing number of non-Indigenous people engaged to 
administer the scheme and supervise participants. With nearly 40 non-
Indigenous staff, BAC is now the second largest employer of people in mainstream 
jobs after the Maningrida education centre. 
ATSIC does not appear to realise that its requirements for high levels of 
accountability and program participant monitoring exacerbate the need to recruit 
people with skills levels that are not locally available. It is not just the 
administration of CDEP that is creating this situation: the increasing 
sophistication of service delivery requires highly skilled and experienced staff with 
entrepreneurial skills and commitment. As argued below, it is inevitable that 
unless local Aboriginal people acquire the qualifications, work experience, and 
professionalism (in non-Indigenous terms) to undertake these tasks, this 
situation will not be reversed for many years. But skills are only one problem: 
Aboriginal cultural ethics and political obligations could also seriously skew the 
pattern of service delivery. 
The issues for BAC are somewhat different. As an organisation it is already a little 
vulnerable, being located on the land of the Dukurridji and paying them rent. 
With growth in non-Indigenous employment the organisation’s management is 
concerned that a high proportion of organisational trading surplus is being 
‘invested’ in housing for non-Indigenous staff. There is also concern that while 
appropriately qualified and committed staff are being recruited to undertake what 
are often technologically complex tasks, most rarely stay beyond a couple of 
years. This raises problems for corporate memory and for the establishment of 
bedded down working relations both with the BAC executive and members, and 
with CDEP participants. The remoteness of Maningrida makes it difficult to 
attract people who will stay and form longer-term workplace partnerships with 
CDEP participants. 
There are evident differences in economic status between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people in the region. At one level, there is an acceptance of a need for 
skilled ‘Balandas’ to work for ‘Bining’. On the other hand, there is a degree of 
resentment that whites seem to hold the power (and management responsibility)  
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in most Maningrida work places. Such resentment spills over into periodic 
political tensions that can in turn become manifest in inter-organisational 
political conflict. 
Stakeholder participation 
The administrative complexity of the CDEP scheme is resulting in alienation of 
BAC members from active participation in decision making. There is a tradeoff 
between external accountability for CDEP efficiency and internal accountability to 
increasingly alienated members. Internal accountability has suffered as a result 
of the unbridled growth of BAC on the back of CDEP, and the lack of strategic 
planning and member participation in charting the organisation’s future. 
Organisational growth and complexity is excluding Aboriginal people—not just as 
full-time employees, but also as stakeholders. The external demands from ATSIC 
for administrative accountability (not for performance) limits the availability of 
organisational resources for stakeholder liaison, involvement, and engagement. 
This important issue needs to be addressed if BAC and its CDEP scheme are to 
prove politically sustainable in the long term. 
The complex sociology of CDEP work 
Current discussions about the CDEP scheme and welfare are permeated by the 
question: ‘why won’t people work?’ This is a false question to ask in many 
situations but it is particularly inappropriate to the outstation situation where 
people receive a fixed amount of CDEP income per fortnight and are not required 
to undertake any structured work. In such situations (contra Pearson 2000) it is 
clear in any case that people do work, in the production of art and craft and 
subsistence foodstuffs, on maintaining social networks, and in looking after 
country. Without doubt, there are also forms of sociability which are destructive, 
such as when people engage in drinking or endless gambling bouts. 
The question is more pertinent to the Maningrida township situation, where 
CDEP participants demonstrate an inconsistent commitment to work and where, 
frequently, available ‘top up’ hours are not taken up. In an early theoretical 
analysis of the CDEP scheme, Altman and Nieuwenhuysen (1979) suggested a 
simple tradeoff between income and ‘leisure’ preferers in a situation where the 
choice was between full-time work or part-time CDEP, and welfare was not an 
option. The model illustrated that the utility function of Aboriginal people, 
especially in remote community contexts, may be maximised via CDEP rather 
than mainstream work and all it entails. Today, the tradeoffs and tensions are far 
more complex. 
Let us look first at the full-time employment option. Full-time jobs are relatively 
rare and require a high degree of skilling—be it in management, administration, 
business, or trades. They also require high levels of responsibility and internal 
and external accountability. They are usually in the service sector, and involve a 
high degree of social pressure and potential stress. In a society where kin-based 
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social relations of production remain dominant, full-time jobs such as these are 
potentially enormously burdensome. The tensions of such employment for 
Aboriginal people are often evident when they take on even the most junior 
administrative tasks. In a kin-based society, demarcations between work place 
and non-work contexts are not clear, and allegiance to close kin usually 
outweighs allegiance to employer, wider kin, the incorporated organisation or 
community, or outsiders. Such tensions can be analysed within the 
anthropological construct of ‘domain separation’ (Rowse 1995; Trigger 1986), 
which suggests that people distinguish between domains where Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal people work. Another framework, modelled in terms of the concept 
of income replacement ratios, suggests that the marginal returns from full-time 
work may be low, especially if there is a requirement for time commitment that 
might have high costs in terms of lost sociability. This is not to say that some 
Aboriginal people do not make the decision to commit to full-time work. But this 
type of commitment is often based on a long-term social relationship developed 
with a non-Aboriginal co-worker, or arises where opportunities for sociability are 
enhanced by the nature of the work. 
In a kin-based society, exerting moral authority within the workplace can be 
extremely difficult, especially given the existence of competing authority 
structures that are often unrelated to employment requirements or formal skill 
levels. Young Aboriginal people may have the formal skills, but lack the complex 
political and social skills required to be longer-term ‘bosses’. This is often evident 
in the dynamics of Aboriginal efforts at management. An initial striving and 
success (often sanctioned by a non-Aboriginal supervisor) is followed by growing 
frustration, a periodic fall from grace, renewed efforts, and often, finally, a sense 
of resignation—it is all too hard in the non-Aboriginal domain. The Aboriginal 
social setting, with its particular cultural form of anti-individualism, is not a 
fertile environment for aspiring leaders. And while some aspire for individual 
success and appear to succeed, this can be at a cost of social exclusion or even of 
violence during a drinking bout. 
And then there is the everyday lived reality: disruptions associated with the 
distribution of alcohol every second Saturday, community pressures and endless 
funerals, constant workplace distractions, visitors, trainers, meetings, 
disappearing vehicles, and an absence of non-Indigenous patterns of work 
activity. It is hardly surprising that in such circumstances all these pressures are 
readily left for the Balandas to bear, defined as their domain, their area of 
expertise. And relatively well-paid and dedicated Balandas generally respond 
positively: they load and unload the barge, they keep the store and service station 
and school and health centre operating, with or without Aboriginal labour. But 
the dependency that is bred by such domain separation also breeds resentment, 
because Balandas have the good jobs, the neat houses, and the new vehicles. 
The many alternatives to full-time work also lessen its significance. There is the 
outstation CDEP option—CDEP as income support without any activity testing, 
without any formal ‘no work, no pay’ rule and, in reality, without any income 
testing. This option provides the optimal individual autonomy to engage in what is 
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immediately defined as of importance. There is also the opportunity to enhance 
income levels beyond a fixed base on a ‘needs’ basis from art and craft 
manufacture or subsistence work effort. 
There is the welfare option which also provides a high degree of autonomy, but 
greater administrative restrictions and, surprisingly, lower status except for the 
old and infirm and single. Newstart Allowances or ‘sitdown’ money carries some 
negative stigma compared to CDEP participation. Such apparent incorporation of 
mainstream Australian values suggests that domains may not be quite as neatly 
separated as the analytic tool and emphasis on cultural difference might suggest: 
an overlap between domains is clearly emerging, where Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal values mesh. 
And finally, there is the ‘town’ CDEP option—project employment—where if one is 
unfortunate the supervisor applies the ‘no work, no pay’ rule rigorously and if one 
is fortunate the rule is applied loosely and ‘top up’ hours are regularly available. 
Practice is at the discretion of non-Aboriginal supervisors who regularly come and 
go, and who all too often have ‘bright’ new ideas and approaches to entrenched 
problems. 
It could be argued that such a diversity of income earning options is positive; but 
it generates uncomfortable tensions and inconsistent practices. There is no doubt 
that, if properly constituted, the CDEP scheme could provide an opportunity to 
expand the regional economy and to make people less dependent and more 
politically engaged. But this is not happening at present for a range of cultural, 
historical, structural and political reasons. At one level, ATSIC views the CDEP 
scheme at Maningrida as a success because it is accountable and things are 
‘happening’. At another level, there is little questioning of who is responsible for 
this activity—Bining or Balanda—and whether the current system is sustainable 
in the longer term. 
Recommendations 
In undertaking this research, we were challenged to come up with concrete 
recommendations that would improve the workability of, and outcomes from, the 
CDEP scheme. This is not an easy challenge, in part because there is great 
diversity in the running of CDEP schemes even in remote regions. There are also 
some long-standing issues in CDEP administration that have been highlighted 
now for nearly a decade (see Altman 1990; Deloitte Touche Tomahtsu 1993). 
Many of these have never been properly addressed, and many, such as the policy 
issues highlighted above, will need concerted action on three levels—community, 
ATSIC, and governmental—if they are to be resolved or ameliorated. Another part 
of the problem is that the CDEP choices people are making may accurately reflect 
their aspiration to achieve an amalgam of cultural continuity and economic 
incorporation. Nevertheless, there are elements of the BAC CDEP scheme that 
could be improved with better policy and it is with a focus on such elements that 
we now move from the particular to the general. 
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First and foremost, it is important to make a clear program distinction between 
CDEP scheme participation in town and country, between situations where CDEP 
operates as employment, training, and community development, and situations 
where it operates as income support. A recommendation was made to government 
over a decade ago to establish a minimum income support program for outstation 
residents (Altman & Taylor 1989) and this proposal should be reconsidered. 
Similarly, every effort should be made to untangle ‘active welfare’ (in the form of 
CDEP participation) from ‘passive welfare’ (Newstart Allowance). An obvious 
corollary to such a recommendation is that the outstation services currently 
underwritten by the CDEP scheme will still need to be funded by government. 
BAC itself recognises existing inconsistencies and, in consultation with ATSIC, is 
exploring options to pay differential amounts to people working for CDEP, people 
receiving CDEP as income support at outstations, and people receiving CDEP as 
income support in the township (Manners 2000). A concerted effort is under way 
to encourage town-based people who do not want to work for welfare (generally 
non-working spouses) to seek Centrelink assistance, not CDEP. Outstation people 
will be expected to reside at outstations while receiving CDEP as income support. 
The novel aspect of such a proposal is that place of residence will need to be 
monitored more closely by supervisors, and this will have resource implications: it 
will not happen unless it is funded. 
‘Top up’ (at $20.00 per participant per fortnight), provided by Centrelink, is 
designed to create equity with mainstream work for the dole. However, it is clear 
that this supplement is sending CDEP participants mixed messages: active 
welfare also has a passive welfare component. It would make far better policy 
sense if this ‘top up’, the disbursement of which is primarily reliant on 
information maintained by BAC’s CDEPManager database, were paid as a block 
grant to CDEP organisations and used by them to ‘top up’ work hours available. 
The introduction of CDEPManager may suit government, but the associated 
payment of CDEP wages on a daily basis operates as a short-sighted and punitive 
measure that undermines the organisation’s ability to offset the non-work of some 
participants some with increased work for others. It is suggested that block 
grants for CDEP participants in total be maintained, and paid on a quarterly 
basis. 
Such a restitution of CDEP wages will require organisations like BAC to convince 
government that it is applying the ‘no work, no pay’ rule across the organisation, 
not differentially at the discretion of individual supervisors. A consistent whole-of-
organisation approach will be required. and an enhanced capacity to generate 
increased hours (and income) for those who seek work. 
This in turn suggests the need for better monitoring of planning and outcomes. 
The recent practice of providing CDEP organisations with triennial funding is 
positive because it facilitates planning. But such planning will be contingent on 
the availability of earmarked resourcing. It is also critical for governments to 
ensure that successful CDEP organisations are not penalised with the burden of 
undertaking additional services and administration that are the primary 
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responsibility of other agencies. This is a major and intractable problem in 
Indigenous affairs generally, and not just limited to CDEP scheme organisations. 
But it is very evident in the role that CDEP organisations like BAC play in 
providing unremunerated training activities, in assisting Centrelink with data, in 
enterprise development, and in inappropriate service delivery activity. 
The benefits and costs of the CDEP scheme 
An overarching question that underlies the research reported here is whether the 
CDEP scheme generates positive net benefits for participating organisations and 
individuals. While the benefit–cost calculations here are informed by the specifics 
of the Maningrida case study, it is likely that these observations have wider 
applicability. The CDEP scheme, as currently constituted, delivers benefits in the 
following ways: 
• it provides employment and training options and opportunities that would be 
non-existent without the scheme; 
• it provides autonomy and more regular (than welfare) income support for 
outstation residents, who are in turn able to supplement their incomes by 
manufacturing art for sale or by producing import-substituting foods; 
• it provides opportunities for income supplementation in the township beyond 
the income tested limits set by Newstart Allowances and pensions; 
• it provides resources and economies of scale that have allowed an Aboriginal 
organisation to evolve into a strong institution, with enhanced capacity, 
which in turn means that the organisation can deliver better services 
including the construction and repair and maintenance of housing and 
infrastructure (including roads, airstrips, water reticulation and sanitation), 
land management and development opportunities; 
• in particular, it provides the opportunity to establish an embryonic regional 
development agency, participating in commercially viable enterprises that 
generate trading profits that can in turn be committed as venture capital, 
that is, ‘private’ not public money; this venture capital activity and risk 
taking is a potentially important avenue for regional investment; 
• in the manner in which it operates it also provides options for participants to 
save, borrow, and invest via a CDEP mechanism that operates as a de facto 
bank, allowing participants to purchase important capital items such as 
vehicles for outstation living; and 
• its options for enforced rent collection and other deductions via CDEP 
payrolls allow collection of moneys for housing and infrastructure repair and 
maintenance, and this also leverages in additional grants from other 
agencies. 
The growth in the CDEP scheme examined here has also had some negative 
aspects, including: 
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• the emergence of political tensions between the CDEP organisation and other 
community-based institutions, sometimes fuelled by the politics of envy 
associated with rapid expansion and relative success; 
• the tension that arises from the inherent inequity in the administration of 
town and country CDEP schemes; 
• organisational complexity that has resulted in management and 
administration being undertaken primarily by non-Indigenous staff; this in 
turn has raised problems of membership disempowerment and entrenched 
economic inequality between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal sectors of the 
organisation’s workforce and regional populations; and 
• difficulties in recruiting and training committed Aboriginal staff to positions 
of responsibility and, in the current mixed passive and active welfare 
environment, difficulty in getting town-based CDEP participants to work. 
On balance, the positives of the CDEP scheme in the Maningrida region appear by 
far to outweigh the negatives. But the working of the scheme can be improved, 
and some recommendations for change have accordingly been made above. Nor 
can the CDEP organisation, ATSIC, or governments be complacent. The BAC 
CDEP scheme is working well at present and current management is investing for 
better and more independent futures for the regional population. But the BAC 
CDEP is operating in a potentially politically volatile environment, with a 
membership that appears somewhat disengaged from the organisation, arguably 
as a consequence of effective service delivery. It will be important therefore for 
current senior management to re-engage the membership, so that their 
participation in the organisation is enhanced, and to promote effective succession 
and strategic planning to ensure the future sustainability of the organisation. 
Notes 
 
1.  Indeed the questionnaire became a BAC instrument for overcoming any ethical issues 
about informed consent. 
2.  In 2000 the unemployment rate in Maningrida would be higher because Centrelink 
data indicate that there are now more than 100 Newstart Allowance participants in 
the town. 
3.  Initially in the form of child endowment (Family Allowance) and pensions, and then 
from about 1979–80 in the form of unemployment benefits. 
4. See also the discussion in Fisher (1999). 
5.  It should be noted that just because artists were on outstation timesheets does not 
mean that all art was produced at outstations. Nevertheless, most art in the region is 
produced at outstations, as has been previously documented (Altman 1983); this is 
partly due to an absence of other income options, but also to the ready availability of 
raw materials. 
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Appendix 1: Participants’ views about the CDEP scheme 
As part of the research undertaken in the Maningrida region, a questionnaire 
including 28 questions was administered in both Maningrida and its outstations. 
The questionnaire instrument was intended to provide a degree of comparability 
between the three CAEPR case studies (Maningrida, Port Augusta, and 
Warrnambool) undertaken in 2000. However it proved to be an ineffective 
instrument and survey results are not fully reported in Gray and Thacker (2000) 
and Madden (2000). 
In the Maningrida region, 40 questionnaires were administered in the town, 
sometimes with the assistance of interpreters and 13 at outstations. Of these, the 
majority (36) were administered by Victoria Johnson, and the balance of 17 by 
Altman and Johnson together. Preliminary analysis indicated that the outstation 
questionnaire responses were of very limited value, while those administered in 
Maningrida (to about 20% of town-based participants) were of some value and 
generated some meaningful results. 
A research assistant, Zaen Khan, was employed in Canberra to tabulate outputs. 
Since the survey was administered under the auspices of BAC, these results have 
been provided to BAC. In this brief appendix, we do not analyse responses to all 
28 questions, but rather highlight some issues of pertinence to the discussions in 
the body of the paper. 
Questionnaire respondents worked on a wide variety of projects in Maningrida 
and nearby, including the Ranger project (8), as MPA builders (4), for the 
Maningrida Council (4), for MAC (3), in the nursery (3), in the BAC office (5), in 
the Women’s Centre (5) and elsewhere (8). The sample included 26 males and 14 
females and most (33) resided in Maningrida. Of the sample, 24 had been on 
CDEP for more than three years, nine for between one and three years, and seven 
for less than one year. 
When asked why they were on CDEP, 23 (57.5%) respondents identified 
employment (a job) as the primary reason, 11 nominated income support (27.5%), 
and two specified training. The majority of responses under the ‘a job’ category 
said that they like the work and/or want to work rather than being idle. Despite 
the fact that only two identified training as the primary reason for being on CDEP, 
26 (65%) reported receiving skills training and 7 (17.5%) on-the-job training. 
When asked what they were doing before CDEP, 16 (40%) said work and 5 
(12.5%) said school, with a significant 17 (42.5%) saying ‘other’ which included 
receiving welfare, being outside the labour force, and living out bush. 
A question on hours worked provided poor results, but when asked if they got any 
work or income outside CDEP, 25 (62.5%) said no, 11 (27.5%) said yes, and the 
balance (4) made no response. 
When asked a qualitative question about some of the good things about CDEP, 
responses included ‘like the work’, ‘good to work’, ‘the money, and can save’, 
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‘working with friends’, ‘going out meeting people’ (on the tucker run), ‘improving 
people’s houses’, ‘helping people’, and ‘learning’ (BAC Office Trainees). When 
asked a qualitative question about some of the not so good things about CDEP, 
the response was poor. Comments included ‘being criticised’, ‘pushy people’, 
‘doing nothing’, occupational health issues (cutting steel—‘bad for ears’, garbage 
truck smells), people asking for money, and concern about letting people down 
when sick. No-one identified poor wages as a bad thing about CDEP. 
Of participants, most (62.5%) agreed that the ‘no work, no pay’ rule was good, 25 
per cent thought it was unfair and 12.5 per cent had no opinion. Of those on 
CDEP, 18 (45%) wanted to move to full-time work, but 15 (37.5%) were happy to 
stay on CDEP. 
When asked what they would do if there were no CDEP, most (19 of 36 
respondents) said they would look for other work, seven said they would stay 
home, six said they would go ‘bush’ for shorter or longer periods, and two said 
they would go back to welfare. 
When asked if CDEP had made life better or worse, 32 (80%) said ‘better’, three 
(7.5%) said ‘worse’ and five (12.5%) saw no difference. When asked what life in 
Maningrida would be like without CDEP, 12 (30%) said that life would be ‘boring, 
terrible, no work’; five (12.5%) said that people would go onto Unemployment 
Benefit; five said that funding would come from elsewhere; eight (20%) were 
unsure, and four (10%) said they would find a job, possibly elsewhere. 
When asked how CDEP could be improved, qualitative responses emphasised the 
need for more work, more money, getting young people involved, getting people 
working together in the community, making the ‘no work, no pay’ rule stronger, 
stopping people arguing about money, and increasing pay to get more people 
working. 
Finally, when asked an administrative question about the Centrelink $20.00 per 
fortnight ‘top up’, 11 (27.5%) said they were receiving this, 13 (32.5%) said they 
were not, eight (20%) said they had signed up and were waiting, and eight made 
no response or were unsure. Only six (15%) had received the retrospective 
payment, 13 (32.5%) had not, 12 (30%) had signed up and were still waiting and 
nine (22.5%) made no response or were unsure. 
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